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I. INMODUCTION
In the two presidential debates of October 1996, the need for
civil litigation reform was mentioned four times,' and the prob-
lems caused by frivolous civil claims were noted three times.2
This attention to reform reflects the widespread debate in Amer-
ica over meritless civil lawsuits.
State lawmakers have recently sought to deter certain types
of frivolous civil claims by requiring special "certificates of merit"
involving the use of an expert opinion. These special certificates
of merit extend beyond general pleading certificates, as in Fed-
eral Civil Procedure Rule 11, and usually require that a claimant
or a claimant's lawyer obtain an expert opinion on the merits of
1. See Presidential Debate, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Fednew File [hereinafter First Debate]; The Second Presidential Debate,
CNN TRANscRi'r #96101601v97, Oct. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CNN
File [hereinafter Second Debate]. Republican candidate Bob Dole pressed incumbent
President Clinton for litigation reform.
2. See First Debate, supra note 1. In response to Bob Dole's call for putting an
end to frivolous lawsuits, President Clinton stated:
In the case of the product liability bill which they passed and I vetoed-I
think that's what he's taling about-I actually wanted to sign that bill, and
I told the people exactly what-the Congress exactly what kind of bill I
would sign. Now a lot of the trial lawyers didn't want me to sign any bill at
all, but I thought we ought to do what we could to cut frivolous lawsuits, but
they wouldn't make some changes that I thought should be made. Now let
me just give you an example. I had a person in the Oval Office who lost a
child in a school bus accident where a drunk driver caused the accident
directly, but there were problems with the school bus. The drunk driver had
no money. Under the new bill, if I had signed it, a person like that could
never have had any recovery. I thought that was wrong.
Id. See also Second Debate, supra note 1. The product liability reform bill vetoed by
President Clinton is discussed later in this Article.
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certain aspects of a particular claim. Standards differ as to who
undertakes certification; the form and content of the expert opin-
ion; when the expert opinion must be submitted, if at all;
whether formal discovery or other information gathering tech-
niques may be compelled prior to any certification; and what
sanctions may or must follow noncompliance. Additionally, these
special certificates of merit occasionally require that a claimant
or a claimant's lawyer certify certain factual allegations underly-
ing particular claims; that is, the who, what, where, why and
how.
Most special certificates of merit involving an expert opinion
concern medical malpractice claims,3 although some certificates
apply to other professional malpractice claims,4 to product liabil-
ity claims,' and to certain sexual abuse claims.6 These certificate
of merit standards are distinct from other new forms of special
pleading requirements, such as for punitive damage requests7
3. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring, in most cases,
expert opinion to be obtained by all claimants prior to filing medical negligence claims);
735 ILL. COuP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 1997) (requiring affidavit and written report
by a health professional in healing art malpractice action); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2912d (West Supp. 1997) (requiring health professional's affidavit of merit in
actions alleging medical malpractice); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 1989 & Supp.
1997) (requiring affidavit regarding expert review in malpractice actions against health
care providers); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225 (West 1988) (requiring affidavits that written
opinions of qualified health care providers have been obtained in actions against health
care providers); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991) (requiring certificate of merit
by claimant's attorney in medical, dental, and pediatric malpractice actions); TEx. REV.
CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i (West Supp. 1997) (requiring expert report in actions alleging
health care liability); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.42 (Anderson Supp. 1996)
(requiring affidavits regarding consultation and review with experts in actions involving
medical, dental, optometric or chiropractic claim). The Ohio Supreme Court held this
statute unconstitutional because it usurped the rulemaking powers of the high court.
See Hiatt v. Southern Health Facilities, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1994).
4. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 411.35 (West Supp. I 1997) (requiring certificate
of merit in actions alleging professional negligence involving a certified architect,
engineer, or land surveyor); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1987) (amended 1996) (requiring
affidavit of a competent expert in professional malpractice cases); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring certificate of merit in malpractice or
negligence action against a person licensed in a profession or occupation).
5. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-623 (West 1997) (requiring certificate of
merit in all product liability actions).
6. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(d) (West 1986) (amended 1994) (requiring
a certificate of merit for plaintiffs 26 years or older making claims of childhood sexual
abuse); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9(B) (West 1997) (requiring certificates of merit
for plaintiffs 21 years or older making claims of criminal sexual activity or physical
abuse during childhood).
7. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.72 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring reasonable showing
of evidence in the record to assert a claim for punitive damages).
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and federal securities fraud actions,' in that expert opinion
pleading is demanded at the outset. These standards are also
distinct from the general legal guidelines on the discoverability
or mandatory disclosure of expert opinions.9
American lawmakers will likely further consider special cer-
tificates of merit involving an expert opinion for diverse claims
within civil litigation. ° Yet, not all lawmakers are convinced of
their need, effectiveness, or validity." Additionally, some special
certificate legislation has been challenged as unconstitutional.
12
8. See 15 U.S.C. § 78r,-4(b) (1996) (requiring that the complaint contain each
statement alleged to have been misleading, the reasons why it is allegedly misleading,
and the facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind). Like the Product Liability Reform Act, President Clinton
vetoed the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, in part, because the pleading
requirement would "'impose an unacceptable procedural hurdle to meritorious claims
being heard in Federal Courts.'" Elliott J. Weiss, The New Securities Fraud Pleading
Requirement: Speed Bump or Road Block?, 38 ARIz. L. REV. 675, 675 (1996) (quoting
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995-Veto Message from the President of
the United States, H. Doc. No. 104-150 (1995)). Subsequently, Congress overrode the
Presidenfs veto. As with other tort reform measures enacted to reduce frivolous claims,
the empirical basis underlying the reform has been questioned. See Leonard B. Simon
& William S. Date, Legislating on a False Foundation: The Erroneous Academic
Underpinnings of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 959, 962 (1996) ("Congress has legislated on the basis of false and/or misleading
data."). The new pleading standards envisioned for federal securities actions are
reviewed in William S. Lerach & Eric A. Isaacson, Pleading Scienter Under Section
21D(b)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Motive, Opportunity, Recklessness, and
the Private Securities Reform Act of 1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 893 (1996).
9. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26.
10. See H.R. 819, 1996 Leg. (Md. 1996) (proposing certificate of merit in actions
against specified licensed or certified professionals); H.R. 2840, 54th Leg., 1996 Reg.
Sess. (Wash. 1996) (proposing a certificate of merit in lawsuits relating to health care);
H.R. 1823, 79th Leg., 1995 Reg. Sess. (Minn. 1995) (proposing certificates of merit for
malpractice actions against design professionals, including architects, engineers, land
surveyors, landscape architects, and interior designers).
11. See H.R. 20, 89th Gen. Assembly 16 (Ill. 1995) (Senate Transcript Mar. 3,
1995) [hereinafter Senate Transcript] at 57 (statement of Sen. Demuzio) (stating there
haven't been any scientific studies that show economic benefits follow from restrictions
on the civil justice system); see also id. at 50-51 (statement of Sen. Shadid) (stating
medical malpractice and product liability account for one-tenth of one percent of all
lawsuits filed in Illinois, product liability lawsuits filed annually have decreased by over
half in the past decade, less than one percent of all manufacturing concerns in the U.S.
have any involvement at all in product liability litigation, there is no lack of product
liability coverage in the present market, no evidence of vastly increased insurance
premiums, and no evidence to suggest an insurance crisis in Illinois); id. at 55
(statement of Sen. Jones) (stating objective studies show the Illinois economy is
growing at a faster rate than the nation as a whole, unemployment is below the
national average, and large employers continue to invest in Illinois).
12. Various trial courts, for example, have found parts of the Illinois General
Assembly tort reform law initiatives of 1995 unconstitutional, including certificates of
merit for product liability claims. The law is now before the Illinois Supreme Court.
CERTIFICATES OF MERIT
Are American courts clogged with frivolous civil claims? If so,
are certain claims prone to more abuse? Can special certificates
of merit involving an expert opinion help eliminate abuse? This
Article explores why special certificates of merit involving an
expert opinion have been adopted and how they operate. This
Article then concludes that American lawmakers should be wary
of these special certificates and implement them for certain civil
claims only after finding that there are adequate empirical bases
and inadequacies in other civil procedure laws, such as general
pleading, other special pleading, or expert opinion discovery or
disclosure laws. In any implementation, the components of these
special certificates, including the expert opinion, the timing of
any release, the opportunity for information gathering, and the
sanctions for noncompliance, should be carefully crafted to en-
sure that access to a judicial remedy is not significantly imper-
iled for deserving claimants and that large unnecessary costs are
not borne by successful claimants.
II. WHY REQUIRE EXPERT OPINION PLEADING?
In exploring special certificates of merit involving an expert
opinion, this Article will first focus on underlying rationales. The
major goal typically is a reduction in the number of frivolous
claims. This goal may be explored through reviewing recent de-
velopments in the product liability realm. Both the Illinois Gen-
eral Assembly and the United States Congress recently consid-
ered such special certificates in the product liability area as a
means to reduce frivolous claims. An examination of the relevant
legislative histories will help explain the empirical bases behind
special pleading rules designed to curb meritless civil lawsuits.
While the goals in the two legislatures were similar, the empiri-
cal foundations for any new pleading rules were unclear. Al-
though the goals and findings were generally similar, Illinois
legislators opted for expert opinion pleading while federal legis-
lators did not, suggesting there is much room for legislative dis-
cretion. Beyond a reduction in frivolous claims, a secondary goal
behind some expert opinion pleading initiatives seemingly in-
volves protecting defendants from reputational harm.
See David Heckelman, Product Suit May Proceed: High Court, CI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan.
24, 1997 at 1, (noting that the case of Vernon Best v. Taylor Machine Works, Nos.
81890-81893, is now pending on appeal before the high court).
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A. Reducing Frivolous Claims
1. The Illinois Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995
In 1995 the Illinois General Assembly passed sweeping tort
reform legislation under the Civil Justice Reform Amendments.13
The stated aims of the amendments were to improve the civil
justice system, to establish fault as the basis for tort liability, to
decrease the systemic cost of tort recovery, to protect the eco-
nomic health of business and local government, to reduce the
frequency and severity of civil claims in product liability actions,
and to protect the availability of affordable liability insurance. 4
To achieve those goals, the amendments included caps on
certain punitive damages, 5 changes in several tort liability,6
13. See Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 89-7, 1995 Ill.
Laws 7. The amendments created many controversial changes in tort law, especially
in the areas of product liability and medical malpractice. Aside from creating a
certificate of merit requirement in product liability actions, the legislature also
amended the certificate of merit provision in healing art actions. See H.R. 20, 89th
Gen. Assembly 105 (M1l. 1995) (House of Representatives Transcript Feb. 16, 1995)
[hereinafter House Transcript] (statement of Rep. Cross) (stating that modification of
the statute to require that the affidavit contain the name of the certifying health care
professional will influence the expert to use the utmost care in making a decision,
thereby reducing the potential for frivolous lawsuits). Another modification prevents
a plaintiff from obtaining the statutory 90-day extension, then voluntarily dismissing
the action, refiling the action, then obtaining another 90-day extension. See id. The
validity of the 1995 legislation is now before the Illinois Supreme Court in Vernon Best
v. Taylor Machine Works, Nos. 81890-81893.
14. See Preamble, 1995 111. Laws 7.
15. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.05 (West 1997). In particular, the Act
states:
(a) In all cases on account of bodily injury, or physical damage to
property based on negligence, or product liability based on any theory or
doctrine, other than those cases described in Section 2-1115 [healing art and
legal malpractice cases], punitive damages may be awarded only if actual
damages are awarded. The amount of punitive damages that may be awarded
for a claim in any civil action subject to this Section shall not exceed 3 times
the amount awarded to the claimant for the economic damages on which such
claim is based.
Id.
16. See title 735, 5/2-1117. In particular, the Act states:
(a) In any action brought on account of death, bodily injury to person, or
physical damage to property in which recovery is predicated upon fault...
a defendant is severally liable only and is liable only for that proportion of
recoverable economic and non-economic damages, if any, that the amount of
that defendant's fault, if any, bears to the aggregate amount of fault of all
other tortfeasors ... whose fault was a proximate cause of the death, bodily
injury, economic loss, or physical damage to property for which recovery is
sought.
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and alterations of liability standards for product liability.17 One
provision required that certificates of merit involving an expert
opinion usually be filed with product liability claims."i
In product liability actions where damages are sought,i" a
claimant or a claimant's lawyer must now submit an affidavit
indicating she has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case
with a qualified expert; that the expert has completed a written
report on the relevant product; and that the report, which must
be attached to the pleading, contains determinations on such
matters as fault and proximate cause.2° The preamble to the
amendments sets out findings and rationales, including those
applicable to the special certificates of merit.21 The Illinois Gen-
eral Assembly found that problems in the civil justice system
affect the creation and retention of jobs;22 create unacceptable
systemic costs of tort liability that threaten the economic health
Id.
17. See John C. Mulgrew, Jr., The Civil Justice Reform Act's Impact on Product
Liability Litigation, TORT TRENDS, Aug. 1996, at 5, 6 [hereinafter TORT TRENDS]. The
new law creates a presumption that the product is reasonably safe if it complies with
state or federal regulations that monitor the safety of products in Illinois. See id.
Under prior law such evidence was admissible as to a defect in the product but did not
create a presumption. Depending on judicial interpretation of the presumption, the
effects could be dramatic. See id. Another important change occurs in the area of
warning standards. The statute flatly states that warnings shall be deemed adequate
if they are in conformity with generally recognized industry standards. See id. Under
prior law, conformity with industry standards was only evidence of adequacy to be
considered by the trier of fact. The new law also specifies that there is no liability if
damage is caused by an inherent characteristic of the product that can not be
eliminated without substantially compromising the product's usefulness or desirability,
which is generally recognized by the community. See id. Previously, under Illinois case
law, liability was imposed when a product had such a dangerous quality that it should
not be placed in the stream of commerce, or, if placed in the stream of commerce, the
risk to the public was so great that liability should be imposed on the manufacturer.
This precedent may no longer have force under the new law. See id.
18. This provision was modeled on, but is different from, an Illinois statute on
medical malpractice claims. See Senate Transcript, supra note 11 (statement of Sen.
Dillard); cf title 735, 5/2-622 (requiring affidavit and written report by a health
professional in cases involving healing art malpractice).
19. See title 735, 5/2-623.
20. Requirements as to other determinations vary, depending upon whether the
claim is an action based on strict liability in tort or implied warranty. See id. at 5/2-
623(a)(1)(A)-(B).
21. See Preamble, 1995 Ill. Laws 7.
22. See House Transcript, supra note 13, at 91 (statement of Rep. Cross) (stating
by 1980, Illinois lost 300,000 jobs; between 1978-1993, manufacturing jobs in Illinois fell
37%; and in 15 years, the manufacturing component of Illinois's economy fell from
26.6% to 17.5% of the workforce). Representative Cross did not cite any studies that
show a causal link between product liability litigation and these statistics.
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of the State through higher consumer prices and increased taxes;
and prompt drastic restrictions in insurance liability coverage as
well as increased insurance premiums for many products and
services."3 The amendments were intended to "reduce the fre-
quency and severity" of product liability claims, so that new
product development would not be chilled by fear of litigation.24
Additional legislative history is scarce. Some history does sug-
gest the new provision requires little more than is mandated
under the general pleading standards, which demand that claim-
ants or their attorneys certify their allegations are well
grounded in fact and are not interposed for any bad purpose.25
This suggestion is founded on the premise that it is virtually
impossible to certify that a product liability claim is well-
grounded in fact without a determination by a qualified expert.26
But if this is true, the general pleading standards should be ade-
quate to deter frivolous product liability claims and special cer-
tificates would be unnecessary.
Opponents of special product liability certificates in Illinois
thus did not agree that the new mandates require little more
than the general pleading standards. They argued that the new
23. See id. at 59 (statement of Rep. Biggins) (stating the Girl Scouts in Southern
Ilinois must sell 53,000 boxes of cookies a year to cover their liability insurance costs;
other areas of the state have similar problems). But see id. at 74 (statement of Rep.
Dart) (stating the Girl Scouts have only been sued once and they were sued by a
member of the Civil Justice League, a major backer of this legislation). Representative
Dart also suggested the high insurance premiums have nothing to do with frivolous
lawsuits. See id.
24. Senate Transcript, supra note 11, at 13 (statement of Sen. Dillard). Senator
Dillard also suggested the reform is a response to people's beliefs "that they should
have the right to sue and receive award for slight, or for inconvenience, or for minor
injury." Id. at 11. Senator DiUllard defended the legislation when he stated:
No one wants unsafe products in the State of Illinois. However, in order to
protect the economic health of our businesses we must provide for rational
review and limits on the way in which product liability litigation may be
brought. We don't know how many good products have not come to market
because of the fear of litigation.
IdM at 13; see also id at 67 (statement of Sen. Fitzgerald) (statingnew small airplanes
carry as much as 50% premium for insurance, and because of that, new planes are not
as competitive as they otherwise would be, forcing people to use older products that
are less safe); idU at 84 (statement of Sen. Dillard) (stating manufacturers provide many
jobs in Illinois and support the legislation because it helps them create jobs and keep
the economy growing without worrying about unmeritorious lawsuits, which have
caused manufacturers to slow research and development).
25. See id at 77 (statement of Sen. Dillard). The general pleading standards are
found in ILL. Sup. CT. R. 137.
26. See Senate Transcript, supra note 11, at 77 (statement of Sen. Dillard).
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provisions would bar many legitimate product liability claims."
Opponents also deemed the legislation unnecessary because
there was no evidence presented showing how the existing civil
justice system negatively affected job creation, job retention, or
insurance costs in Illinois.
28
2. The proposed Federal Common Sense Product Liability and
Legal Reform Act of 1996
The United States Congress also recently relied on argu-
ments based on job creation, job retention, and insurance costs
when it forwarded to President Clinton a bill containing a special
pleading standard aimed at reducing frivolous product liability
claims.29 The bill, known as the Common Sense Product Liability
and Legal Reform Act of 1996, was vetoed by President Clinton
on May 2, 1996.'o Unlike the Illinois General Assembly, Congress
opted for a special standard that did not include expert opinion
pleading.
3 '
The proposed federal pleading law required claimants pre-
senting product liability claims to certify by signature that, to
the signors' "best knowledge, information and belief, formed
27. See id. at 22 (statement of Sen. Welch) (speaking of the amendments to
product liability as a whole, not the certificate of merit provision alone).
28. See supra note 11.
29. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996).
30. See United States Bill Tracking, 1995 United States House Bill No. 956, 104th
Congress-1995-96 Regular Session, available in LEXIS, Legis Library, Bltrck file; see
also Sherman Joyce, Federal Product Liability Litigation Reform: Recent Developments
and Statistics, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 421, 423, 431 (1996) [hereinafter Federal Product
Liability]. President Clinton wrote in a letter he would veto the bill because it
"represents an unwarranted intrusion on state authority." Id. at 423. However, the
article concluded that Congress has the authority to legislate in the field of product
liability because it "is inextricably intertwined with matters that are fundamental to
interstate commerce; the manufacture, distribution, and sale of products." Id. at 431;
see generally Gary T. Schwartz, Considering the Proper Federal Role in American Tort
Law, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 917, 918-19 (1996) (finding that, although Republicans usually
support devolving federal regulation to the states and liberals usually support
expansion of federal programs, the reverse is true when it comes to federalization of
tort law and suggesting the federalism argument was only used strategically).
31. The 105th Congress is continuing to formulate a product liability reform act
that might be acceptable to President Clinton. A proposal introduced in the Senate on
January 21, 1997, does not contain a special pleading requirement but still includes
provisions for caps on punitive damages, abolishes joint liability, and provides for either
a plaintiff or a defendant to make an offer for alternative dispute resolution within 60
days of service of the complaint or the applicable deadline for a responsive pleading.
See S. Res. 5, 105th Cong. (1997).
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after reasonable inquiry," the pleading was not frivolous.32 "Friv-
olous" was defined as groundless and brought in bad faith, or
groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment, or
groundless and interposed for only an improper purpose.33
"Groundless" was defined as having no basis in fact or not war-
ranted by existing law or good faith argument for extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law.34 Under the bill, a de-
fendant could move for a determination that a product liability
pleading was frivolous,35 which would prompt the court to con-
sider such factors as the multiplicity of the parties, the complex-
ity of the claims and defenses, the length of time available to the
claimant to investigate and conduct discovery, and other mat-
ters.36 Appropriate sanctions for noncompliance included striking
the pleading or its offending portion, dismissing a party, and
ordering the offending party to pay reasonable expenses, includ-
ing costs, attorney fees, witness and expert fees, and deposition
expenses.37
Substantive alterations in product liability law accompanied
these procedural law changes. 8 The special pleading provisions






38. See 142 CONG. REC. H2238 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1996). The proposed changes
stated in part:
(a) GENERAL RULE.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-In any product liability action, a product seller other
than a manufacturer shall be liable to a claimant only if the claimant
establishes-
(A) that-
(i) the product that allegedly caused the harm that is the subject
of the complaint was sold, rented, or leased by the product seller,
(ii) the product seller failed to exercise reasonable care with
respect to the product; and
(iii) the failure to exercise reasonable care was a proximate cause
of harm to the claimant;
(B) that-
(i) the product seller made an express warranty applicable to the
product that allegedly caused the harm that is the subject of the
complaint, independent of any express warranty made by a manufacturer
as to the same product;
(ii) the product failed to conform to the warranty; and
(iii) the failure of the product to conform to the warranty caused
harm to the claimant; or
(C) that-
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went beyond the general pleading requirements found in Federal
Civil Procedure Rule 11 by specifically including such available
remedies as the assessment of witness fees and deposition costs,
by not including a safe harbor provision that allows a claimant
twenty-one days to amend a challenged pleading in order to
avoid certain sanctions, and by not limiting sanctions to those
sufficient to deter comparable conduct.39
As in Illinois, there was much debate over the necessity of
special pleading mandates. Proponents argued the legislation
would help end certain civil litigation abuse and prompt job cre-
ation and growth for the economy.40 Proponents claimed contem-
porary product liability law places enormous burdens on inter-
state commerce, causing inflated prices and stifling innovation.4'
Proponents relied on survey reports of manufacturers and on the
perceptions of CEOs on the costs of product liability litigation to
their businesses.42
Proponents did not, however, cite statistics on the number of
frivolous product liability claims. They did say claimants had
become "remarkably skilled at identifying and joining defendants
with deep pockets who, despite limited responsibility for injury,
would rather settle a case than face the costs and publicity asso-
ciated with litigation."I This suggests proponents believed many
claimants, hoping for settlements, sued without much basis for
their claims. Proponents argued that the bill would ensure legiti-
(i) the product seller engaged in intentional wrongdoing, as
determined under applicable State law; and
(ii) such intentional wrongdoing was a proximate cause of the
harm that is the subject of the complaint.
Id. at H2240.
39. Cf FED. R. CIv. P. 11. The present rule focuses on public interest sanctions
as reprimands, fines, and disciplinary referrals rather than on such private interest
sanctions as fee and cost recovery. Additionally, it contains a safe harbor provision and
stresses deterrence. On the changes in remedies under the 1993 version of the Federal
Civil Procedure Rule 11, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Fines Under New Federal Civil Rule
11: The New Monetary Sanctions for the "Stop-and-Think Again" Rule, 1993 BYU L.
REV. 879.
40. See 142 CoNG. REC. H3184, H3185 (daily ed. Mar. 29, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Hyde) (stating the reforms did not go as far as he would have liked, but were a step
in correcting "the current out-of-control legal system").
41. See id. at H3189 (statement of Rep. Bliley) (explaining the connection between
product liability law and interstate commerce by stating- "As transportation and
communications systems developed, more products crossed State boundaries, increasing
the volume of interstate commerce exponentially, creating more interstate product
liability.").
42. See id. at H3189-90.
43. Id. at H3190.
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mate claimants their day in court while reducing frivolous
claims."
Opponents of the bill disagreed with the need for reform and
questioned the stated goals.' 5 They argued the bill was designed
to disadvantage American consumers and benefit corporations.46
Opponents further claimed the bill would not only fail to reduce
frivolous claims, but also would remove the threat of private
lawsuits as the most important deterrent to "dangerous prod-
ucts."47 They cited research that product liability suits represent
less than 2% of litigation in America, product liability insurance
premiums dropped more than 28% during 1989 to 1994, and
product liability filings have been decreasing.' Further, they
argued the bill would have little effect on American competitive-
ness since the total cost for all product liability claims only rep-
resents one cent per every five-dollar purchase. 49 Finally, oppo-
nents complained that so-called tort reformers were seeking to
create or expand and then exploit the myth of a litigation explo-
sion.5 ° They cited the U.S. Chamber of Commerce's advertise-
ment stating that "'Girl Scouts in just one area have to sell
87,000 boxes of their cookies just to protect against lawsuits,'"'
though Girl Scout officials denied being bombarded with frivo-
lous lawsuits.52
44. See id. at H3193 (statement of Rep. Stearns).
45. See generally id. at H3184 (containing statements of opponents of the bill).
46. See id. at H3187 (s atement of Rep. Conyers).
47. Id. at H3188. Representative Conyers further stated:
If Members do not think that the threat of private lawsuits can help keep
dangerous products off the market, which is what we hope to continue to do
in our legal system, just ask the parents of children who have been killed by





50. See Beth Rogers, Legal Reform-At the Expense of Federalism?: House Bill
956, Common Sense Civil Justice Reform Act and Senate Bill 565, Product Liability
Reform Act, 21 U. DAYTON L. REV. 513, 524-25 (1996) [hereinafter Legal Reform] (stating
that various proponents of tort reform exploit the facts of numerous lawsuits including
the infamous McDonald's coffee-spilling case to get public support for tort reform). The
article also states that federal product liability reform is unnecessary and
constitutionally questionable because, under the Interstate Commerce Clause and the
Tenth Amendment, Congress' ability to preempt state law is limited. See id. at 521.
51. Id. at 525 (quoting Saundra Torry, Tort and Retort: The Battle Over Reform
Heats Up, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1995, at 7).
52. See id.
CERTIFICATES OF MERIT
The empirical evidence utilized in the recent Illinois and
congressional debates on the numbers and costs of frivolous
product liability claims in both the Illinois and federal courts is
uncertain, with no reason to believe clarity will soon arrive. Nev-
ertheless, debate and reform involving expert opinion pleading in
the product liability arena will likely continue. There is a need
for more work on whether product liability claims are particu-
larly susceptible to pleading abuse. Given recent American
pleading-law reforms outside of the product liability arena, new
initiatives involving expert opinion pleading likely will also be
proposed for such other civil claims as professional malpractice
and childhood sexual abuse, though here too empirical data is
scant or uncertain.
Before reviewing some current expert opinion pleading stan-
dards, another less-noted rationale for such standards will be
explored. This rationale involves the protection of certain civil
defendants from significant reputational harm arising from the
mere filing of frivolous civil lawsuits.
B. Protection from Reputational Harm
Although there may be little empirical evidence to suggest
courts are clogged with frivolous product liability lawsuits, other
legitimate purposes for requiring expert opinion pleading may
exist. Another major goal may be to protect the defendant's repu-
tation. At least one special certificate of merit standard involving
an expert opinion, required in civil cases for damages suffered
from childhood sexual abuse, seems partially based on protecting
the defendant's reputation."
Several notorious product liability lawsuits illustrate the
potential for harm to a defendant's reputation when there is
significant media attention. In 1982, civil lawsuits were filed
against Johnson and Johnson by the families of victims who died
after taking cyanide-laced Tylenol; the families alleged that the
product was defective because its package was not tamper resis-
53. See CAL Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1997). Even after certificates of merit
are executed by a claimant's attorney and licensed mental health practitioner, pleadings
may only designate "Doe" defendants until the trial court judge finds there has been
an appropriate "certificate of corroborative fact." Id. Further, the Doe pleadings may
not even be served on defendants until the trial court judge has reviewed the
certificates of merit. See icL
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tant 4 The litigation defense costs were great, but the costs in-
volving harm to the defendant's reputation were greater. A
stockbroker said at the time: "The name Tylenol is now linked
with poison in people's minds."55 When a product is implicated in
causing death or injury, fear and loss of public confidence can
destroy years of effort spent promoting and creating a good repu-
tation among consumers." Further, when the quality of one
product is questioned, there is potential for a drop in public con-
fidence for the manufacturer's other products," and not only the
one manufacturer, but also the whole industry may suffer.5
Because product liability lawsuits can have tremendous neg-
ative effects on defendants' reputations, or even upon entire
industries, there is some logical support for requiring special
certificates of merit. The value of such certificates must be
weighed, however, against the possibility of deterring meritori-
ous claims, as well as informing the public of possible safety
risks with certain dangerous products.
Another area where special pleading laws may seek to pro-
tect a defendant's reputation through the requirement of expert
opinion pleading involves civil actions by adults for sexual abuse
occurring during their childhood. A California law59 and a Louisi-
ana law6" each require expert opinion pleading before certain of
these claims may proceed. Civil filings by victims of childhood
sexual abuse have been rising, perhaps because criminal laws
54. See George J. Church, Murder by Remote Control: The Tylenol Case Brings
Calls for Tamperproof Packaging of Drugs, TIME, Oct. 18, 1982, at 16, 19.
55. Susan Tifft, Poison Madness in the Midwest; Seven People Die after Taking
Cyanide-laced Tylenol, TILE, Oct. 11, 1982, at 18, 18.
56. See A Death Blow for Tylenol?, Bus. WK, Oct. 18, 1982, at 151, 151.
57. Cf. Rebecca Fannin, Most Lie Low When Disaster Strikes, MARETING &
MEDIA DECISIONS, Jan. 1983, at 58.
58. See Marc G. Weinberger & Jean B. Romeo, The Impact of Negative Product
News, Bus. HoRizoNs, Jan. 1989, at 44. An example cited was the product liability
lawsuits against the makers of Rely tampons based on research suggesting a causal
link between tampon use and toxic shock syndrome. Tampon use declined five percent,
reflecting three to four million women discontinued use of tampons. Id. When lawsuits
were filed alleging hand-held cellular phones caused users to develop brain cancer, the
media and public reaction was quick Some felt the industry would never be the same.
See Fredric S. Newman, Products Liability-Don't Get Caught, CELLULAR MARKETING,
May 1993, at 30 [hereinafter Products Liability].
59. See CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 340.1 (West 1997).
60. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9 (West Supp. 1997); see also Gregory G.
Gordon, Comment, Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse and the Statute of
Limitations: The Need for Consistent Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule, 20
PEPP. L. REv. 1359, 1359 (1993) [hereinafter Adult Survivors].
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ineffectively punish and deter. At least 200,000 new instances of
childhood sexual abuse are reported each year in America, and
some experts believe that as many as one in three females and
one in six males are sexually abused as children.6
Given these statistics, large numbers of civil lawsuits might
be expected. But many potential plaintiffs are discouraged by the
adversarial nature of litigation and the stress of dealing with
disturbing issues.62 Where claimants do step forward, many
mental health experts question the validity of claims founded on
the recovery of repressed childhood memories. 63 Additionally, the
potential public attention will often cause defendants much
stress, especially if they are public officials or persons who work
with children, such as teachers or priests. Careers and lives may
be ruined even when the allegations are never proven, or even
proven beyond any doubt to be false. As in the product liability
setting, there are valid interests for requiring certificates of
merit to protect against reputational harm caused by false
claims.
Yet when considering such interests, legislatures need to
inquire as to any bases for assuming childhood sexual abuse
plaintiffs are fabricating claims or are being misled by experts
and others.6 4 In light of statistics reflecting increasing incidents
of childhood sexual abuse, is it appropriate to increase the proce-
dural law requirements and thus the costs for filing such claims
in order to protect alleged abusers?" And if some protection
against reputational harm is appropriate, may it be achieved by
heightened pleading and verification requirements rather than
by expert opinion pleading? Further, should there be the same
concern about frivolous lawsuits for all childhood sexual abuse
claims? In California, expert opinion pleading seems chiefly man-
dated for repressed memory cases pursued by adults,66 but in
61. See Adult Survivors, supra note 60, at 1363.
62. See id. at 1374.
63. See Calor McHugh, Suits Claiming Childhood Sex Abuse on Rise; Lawyers,
Experts Question Recovered Memories, CI. DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 22, 1993, at 1.
64. See generally Adult Survivors, supra note 60, at 1402 (describing a proposed
legislative response).
65. See id.
66. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(a), (d) (West 1997) (requiring when an adult
claimant has always remembered the abuse, suit must be commenced by the age of 26
and no certificates of merit are needed; if an adult claimant only recalls the childhood
abuse as an adult, and thus is likely over 26 when filing the claim, then certificates
of merit are needed).
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Louisiana similar expert opinion pleading standards apply to all
cases when childhood sexual abuse is claimed by adults, 7 even
when there are no repressed memory issues or where eyewitness
accounts or a defendant's own statements constitute the most
important evidence for the claimant.
In the following section, recent expert opinion pleading initia-
tives aimed at reducing meritless civil claims will be examined.
These initiatives demonstrate the wide range of available ap-
proaches to similarly perceived problems. At the outset, the typi-
cal general pleading requirements, which operate in the absence
of special certificate of merit standards, will be reviewed so that
the option to "do nothing" special can be measured.
III. EXAMPLES OF EXPERT OPINION PLEADING
In America today there are varying legislative directives
aimed at reducing certain types of meritless civil claims by re-
quiring some form of expert opinion pleading. Some of the laws
demand that civil claimants produce a supporting expert opinion
at the time of an initial pleading.6" Others demand such an opin-
ion shortly after the initial pleading, usually long before there
has been extensive discovery or pretrial conference time devoted
to trial preparation." On occasion, an expert opinion is needed
even before a civil claim can be filed.7" The following sections
examine some current expert opinion pleading laws, as well as
general pleading certification standards, to demonstrate con-
trasting approaches.
A. General Pleading Certification Standards
In the absence of heightened pleading requirements, includ-
ing certificates of merit involving an expert opinion, general
pleading requirements serve to reduce frivolous civil lawsuits.
67. See LA. REV. STAT. AIN. § 9:2800.9(B) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring certificates
of merit by attorney and licensed mental health practitioner for all sexual abuse of a
minor claims filed by claimants twenty-one or older).
68. See AM. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602 (West Supp. 1996); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 411.35 (Supp. I 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1993) (amended 1996); 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 1997); id. at 5/2-623; MicH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 600.2912d (West Supp. 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991).
69. See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 538.225 (West 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West Supp. 1997); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (1991).
70. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(2) (West Supp. 1997).
CERTIFICATES OF MERIT
On the federal level, the original version of Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure required signed pleadings to be
supported by "good ground," did not expressly require reasonable
prefiling inquiry, and permitted "appropriate disciplinary action"
against an attorney who willfully violated the rule."1 Under Rule
11, as amended in 1983, mandatory sanctions, which usually
included attorneys' fees, were to be imposed on those who signed
pleadings that were not "well grounded in fact and . . .war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the exten-
sion, modification, or reversal of existing law."72 Further, the
1983 rule required the signor to certify there had been a reason-
able prefiling inquiry. The rule was again amended in 1993, al-
lowing groundless papers to be more easily withdrawn within a
twenty-one day safe harbor period without fear of sanction, and
making attorney fee awards less available as a remedy for non-
compliance. Many state legislatures and state supreme courts
have adopted provisions which parallel Federal Rule 11, al-
though some have modifications of the rule.73 Yet recently, at
least in certain contexts, both federal and state lawmakers have
shown their dissatisfaction with such general pleading rules by
adopting special certificate of merit and other special pleading
requirements.
71. Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to "Frivolous" Litigation: A
Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV.
1067, 1075 (1994).
72. Id. at 1074 (stating that the amendments were designed to encourage courts
to impose sanctions because few sanctions had been imposed under the prior version).
73. See id. at 1094-95.
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B. Illinois Product Liability
The new Illinois product liability pleading law74 usually re-
quires a special certificate of merit from a claimant's expert. It
specifically provides that an affidavit shall be filed with the
pleading of a claim, declaring the affiant, usually the claimant's
lawyer, reviewed the case with a qualified expert.75 A qualified
expert is someone who possesses scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge regarding the product at issue or similar
products.76 The expert must have completed a written report
after examining the product, or reviewing the literature pertain-
ing to the product,77 with the report attached to the pleading. In
74. See 735 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/2-623 (West 1997). The law has been
challenged on constitutional grounds in a case now before the Illinois Supreme Court.
See Panzer v. Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., No. 95L9815 (Cook County Cir. Ct. May
22, 1996). The law was found, in part, to require the expert not only to make a
technical conclusion, but also to do a substantial search of legal standards as well as
industry standards, thus violating the separation of powers and the right to a jury trial
provisions "by making it a precondition... that a plaintiff in a product liability case
file this very substantial, and detailed, affidavit prior to the case actually beginning."
Id.; cf Martin H. Redish, The Constitutionality of Illinois Tort Reform, IV Product
Liability, IDC Q., 3d Quarter 1996, at 8, 9 (stating constitutional challenges that may
be brought are denial of right of access to the courts, violation of separation of powers,
and contravention of the bar of special legislation). Specifically, Professor Redish
concluded: "For an attack under the special legislation prohibition to succeed, those
challenging the law would have to establish that the General Assembly's application
of the certificate of merit requirement only in product liability actions is irrational. This
they will be unable to do." Id. As to any separation of powers challenge, Redish
suggested that plaintiffs misconstrued the product liability law provision when they
argued that the legislature had created a rebuttable presumption and determined the
only way in which it can be rebutted. He suggested the legislature was permissibly
altering the governing substantive law by establishing a product is reasonably safe
unless a feasible alternative design existed, and that the point in which a plaintiff is
required to establish the existence of a feasible alternative design is a matter of social
policy to be decided by the legislature. See id. at 10-11. See also David Bailey, New
Product Liability Affidavits Stricken as 'Tort Reform" Hit Again, CmI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Sept. 17, 1996, at 1 (reviewing circuit rulings of unconstitutionality).
75. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-623(a)(1) (West 1997).
76. See id. at 5/2-623(c); Note, Tort Law-Product Liability-Illinois Imposes
Certificate of Merit Requirement On Product Liability Actions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 705,
708 (1996) [hereinafter Tort Law] (stating the definition of expert "probably allows for
a range of friendly sources from whom a plaintiff can obtain 'qualified' certification").
77. See title 735, 5/2-623(a)(1); see also Tort Law, supra note 76, at 709-10
(stating bases for strict liability theories can probably be determined through
examinations without discovery but allegations of negligence, recklessness, or
willfulness in causing harm are often demonstrable only with information obtained
through court-ordered discovery, and concluding that making negligence theories as
hard to certify as strict liability theories is at odds with the legislature's stated goal
of supporting fault-based thecries). But see Braverman v. Kucharik Bicycle Clothing
Co., 678 N.E.2d 80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (absence of allegedly defective product was not
fatal to claim in product liability).
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an action based on strict liability or implied warranty, the report
must identify specific defects that have a potential for harm
beyond that which would be objectively contemplated by the
ordinary user and must determine that the product was in a
defective condition or unreasonably dangerous when it left con-
trol of the manufacturer." In other product liability actions, the
report must point to the specific conduct on the part of the defen-
dant and determine that the product's defective condition or
other fault was a proximate cause of the claimant's harm. 9
When the defective condition is based on a design defect, the
expert report must demonstrate a feasible alternative design
that existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's con-
trol or an applicable government or industry standard to which
the product did not conform. 0 Some supporters of the new prod-
uct liability law viewed its pleading requirements as adding little
to the pleading burdens imposed upon claimants by the preexist-
ing Illinois Supreme Court general pleading rule.8'
The statute provides some leeway for claimants. If a claim-
ant has not voluntarily dismissed an earlier action based on the
same occurrences and an affiant was unable to consult with an
expert because of statute of limitations problems despite a good
faith effort to comply, or the claimant was prevented from in-
specting or conducting nondestructive testing of the product,
upon submission of an affidavit the claimant may be given ninety
more days to file.82 Failure to file an affidavit shall be grounds
78. See title 735, 5/2-623(a)(1)(A)(i), (ii); see also TORT TRENDS, supra note 17, at
6 (suggesting that this provision exclusively adopts the "consumer contemplation test"
indicated by RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A and that the "risk-benefit
analysis" test for a product defect is no longer available in Illinois; and further
suggesting that given the specificity required in the certificate of merit, also
unavailable is the theory of an "unidentified" defect that the plaintiff establishes by
proving the product caused injury or damage in failing to perform in the manner
reasonably expected in light of its nature and intended function, as well as the absence
of an abnormal use of the product).
79. See title 735, 5/2-623(a)(1)(B); see, e.g., Irizarry v. Digital Equip. Corp., 919
F. Supp. 301, 305 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding affidavit is inadequate when attorney merely
consults with an expert regarding the type of product used by the plaintiff where
important facts are not alleged and the report fails to determine that the defective
product was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury).
80. See title 735, 5/2-623(b).
81. See Senate Transcript, supra note 11, at 77. This view seemingly arose from
the Illinois Supreme Court's finding that the comparable special pleading statute on
healing art malpractice claims differed little from its own general pleading rule. See
DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139 (M11. 1992).
82. See title 735, 5/2-623(a)(2).
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for dismissal.8 3 The statute has been deemed substantive and
thus applicable in federal trial courts hearing Illinois product
liability claims."4
C. Illinois Healing Art Malpractice
The Illinois product liability statute85 was modeled after an
earlier Illinois statute dealing with healing art malpractice. 6
The healing art malpractice provisions cover most pleadings
wherein claimants seek damages for injury or death caused by
medical, hospital, or other healing art professionals.8 7 An affida-
vit is usually required of the claimant or the claimant's lawyer,
wherein she states she reviewed the case with a health profes-
sional who she reasonably believes is knowledgeable in relevant
issues, has practiced or taught within the last six years in the
relevant area of health care or medicine, and is qualified in the
subject of the case. s The affiant must also conclude upon review
of the health professional's written report that "there is a rea-
sonable and meritorious cause" for filing the civil action. 9 The
health professional's written report must be attached to the affi-
davit and must state that after review of the medical record and
other relevant materials, the health professional has determined
that "there is a reasonable and meritorious cause" for filing the
civil action.9 ° A separate report is needed for each defendant.9
83. See id. at 5/2-623(e) (West 1997).
84. See Irizarry, 919 F. Supp. at 304 (finding the statute is substantive because
it applies to a particular substantive area and it would defeat the state legislature's
intent to influence the substantive outcome by allowing parties to lessen their litigation
burden by filing in federal cou-t).
85. Title 735, 5/2-622.
86. See Senate Transcript, supra note 11, at 15.
87. See title 735, 5/2-622(a). The law on expert affidavits for medical malpractice
claims has been sustained upon constitutional attack. See DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's
Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139 (Ill. 1992); McAlister v. Schick, 588 N.E.2d 1151 (Ill. 1992).
Commentators have reviewed and endorsed these rulings. See Saul J. Morse &
Elizabeth W. Anderson, DeLuna in Review: Upholding the Medical Malpractice Affidavit
Requirement, 80 ILL. B.J. 454 (1992).
88. See title 735, 5/2-622!a)(1).
89. Id.
90. Id. The statute further requires:
If the affidavit is filed as to a defendant who is a physician licensed to treat
human ailments without the use of drugs or medicines and without operative
surgery, a dentist, a podiatrist, or a psychologist, the written report must be
from a health professional licensed in the same profession, with the same
class of license, as the defendant. For affidavits filed as to all other
defendants, the written report must be from a physician licensed to practice
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The healing art malpractice provisions protect claimants who
previously have not voluntarily dismissed a related action and
who cannot obtain the health professional report before the stat-
ute of limitations runs in that the provisions allow extensions
when the examination and copying of relevant medical records
has been delayed because they have not been produced.92 When
allegations and denials in the affidavit are made without reason-
able cause and are found to be untrue, the claimant, her attor-
ney, or both "shall" be subject to the payment of the other party's
resulting reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees. 3 A reviewing
health professional who prepares a report in good faith has civil
immunity. 4 Failure to file an affidavit "shall be grounds for dis-
missal."95 The statute has been regarded as substantive and thus
applicable at least in federal trial courts hearing Illinois healing
art malpractice claims.96
The Illinois Supreme Court, in DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hos-
pital,9 addressed the relationship between the certificates of
merit required for healing art malpractice claims and the gen-
eral pleading rule in Illinois, which provides in part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certification
by him that he has read the pleading,... that to the best of his
medicine in all its branches. In either event, the affidavit must identify the
profession of the reviewing health professional. A copy of the written report,
clearly identifying the plaintiff and the reasons for the reviewing health
professional's determination that a reasonable and meritorious cause for the
filing of the action exists, must be attached to the affidavit. The report shall
include the name and the address of the health professional.
Id.
91. See id. at 5/2-622(a)(3)(b).
92. See id. at 5/2-622(a)(3).
93. See id. at 5/2-622(a)(3)(e). The statute further states:
In no event shall the award for attorneys' fees and expenses exceed those
actually paid by the moving party, including the insurer, if any. In
proceedings under this paragraph (e), the moving party shall have the right
to depose and examine any and all reviewing health professionals who
prepared reports used in conjunction with an affidavit required by this
Section.
Id.
94. See id. at 5/2-622(3)(f).
95. Id. at 5/2-622(3)(g).
96. See Doe v. City of Chicago, 883 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Ill. 1994). On
similar state professional malpractice pleading statutes, the lower federal courts are
divided on applicability under the Erie doctrine. Compare Oslund v. United States, 701
F. Supp. 710, 714 (D. Minn. 1988) (applicable), with Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609,
611-12 (S.D. Ga. 1990) (not applicable).
97. 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1145 (M11. 992).
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knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable
inquiry it is well grouaded in fact and is warranted by existing
law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. 8
The court found that the pleading requisites for healing art mal-
practice claims were similar to the general pleading rule's re-
quirements because expert opinions in healing art malpractice
claims would usually be necessary to satisfy the general pleading
rule obligation that "reasonable investigation" was undertaken.99
The scant legislative history and judicial precedent suggest
that the primary differences between the special certificates of
merit requirements for healing art malpractice claims and the
general pleading rules are that the former are more specific in
what is required for reasonable investigation. However, the con-
sequences of noncompliance with healing art malpractice law
and with the general pleading rule requirements seem quite
different. Shortcomings in an attorney's affidavit for a healing
art malpractice claim will more likely result in dismissal, as that
sanction is expressly noted in the statutory scheme. 100 Under the
general pleading rule,""' sanctions are imposed at the discretion
of the judge, dismissal is not expressly mentioned, and a party
usually does not suffer dismissal due to an attorney's failings.0 2
98. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 137.
99. DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1145; see also Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs.,
Inc., 807 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Mo. 1991) (noting medical malpractice petition procedure
"parallels the practice already prescribed for all civil actions, and is hardly more
onerous to the right to trial by jury").
100. See title 735, 5/2-622(g) (stating failure of attorney to file proper certificate
"shall be grounds for dismissal"); see also id. at 5/2-623(e) (same for product liability
claims). But see Idndgren v. Moore, 907 F. Supp. 1183 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding
dismissal for noncompliance with healing art malpractice certification standards is
discretionary, not mandatory).
101. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 137 states, in part:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the
court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person
who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which
may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of
reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, motion or
other paper, including a reasonable attorney fee.
102. However, dismissals are more appropriate where a party and her attorney
share joint and several liability for an intentional rule violation (as where an attorney
knowingly engaged in insufficient inquiry and her client as a claimant verified
pleadings she had reason to question). See, e.g., Edwards v. Estate of Harrison, 601
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D. Florida Medical Negligence
Florida has a two-tiered expert opinion pleading require-
ment. 0 3 First, a potential plaintiff must investigate prior to issu-
ing a "notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litiga-
tion."104 Upon investigation, the claimant must conclude "any
named defendant" was negligent in the care of plaintiff and such
negligence was the cause of claimant's injury.105 Claimant must
submit'016 a "verified written medical expert opinion" to corrobo-
rate the finding of reasonable grounds at the time the notice
regarding a possible lawsuit is mailed.0 7 The potential defen-
dant is required to investigate prior to responding to the no-
tice. 08 If the defendant rejects the claim, she must submit a
verified written medical expert opinion that "reasonable grounds
for lack of negligent injury" exist.0 9 If a medical expert supplying
an opinion has had any previous opinion disqualified, the expert
must specify the opinion and the relevant court and case num-
ber." If the claim is not settled before the end of the notice pe-
riod,"' a plaintiff must file a certificate of counsel with the initial
N.E.2d 862, 869 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
103. Florida's expert opinion pleading requirement for medical negligence claims
is reviewed in John A. Grant, Florida's Presuit Requirements for Medical Malpractice
Actions, 68 FLA. B.J. 12 (1994).
104. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(2) (West Supp. 1997). Michigan also has a prefiling
notice requirement. One-hundred-eighty-two days before filing a medical malpractice
action, plaintiff must notify each defendant. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912b(1)
(West Supp. 1997). The notice must contain the factual basis for the claim, the
applicable standard of care, the manner of breach, the action that should have been
taken, and the proximate cause. See id. § 600.2912b(4). The provision does not
expressly require an expert opinion at this stage, as in Florida, but such an opinion
seems, as a practical matter, necessary. The defendant must respond to the notice with
a factual basis for defenses, including compliance with the standard of care and the
lack of proximate cause. See id. § 600.2912b(7). After the notice period, if plaintiff files
an action for medical malpractice, plaintiff must attach an affidavit of merit signed by
an expert health professional. See id. § 600.2912d(1)(d). The affidavit must certify the
expert reviewed the notice and medical records supplied and state the applicable
standard of care, the expert's opinion as to breach of that standard, how the standard
should have been complied with, and how the breach was the proximate cause of
injury. See id.
105. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(2) (West Supp. 1997).
106. This language implies the written expert opinion must be attached to the
notification.
107. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(2)(b) (West Supp. 1997).
108. See id. § 766.203(3).
109. Id. § 766.203(3)(b).
110. See id. § 766.203(4).
111. See id. § 766.106(3)(a) (stating no suit may be filed within 90 days after
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pleading."' This certificate is required in any civil action "arising
out of medical negligence, whether in tort or in contract."1 3 The
certificate must state there was a "reasonable investigation" that
gave claimant or his counsel "a good faith belief that grounds
exist" for an action against each named defendant." 4 Good faith
"may be shown to exist" where the claimant has obtained a writ-
ten medical expert opinion that "there appears to be evidence of
medical negligence."" 5 This expert opinion is not subject to nor-
mal discovery." 6 If the court finds the certificate of counsel
lacked good faith and no justiciable issue was presented against
a health care provider who cooperated in informal discovery, the
court "shall award" costs and attorney's fees against counsel and
"shall submit the mattr... for disciplinary review of the attor-
ney."" Plaintiff may petition the court for a ninety-day exten-
sion of the statute of limitations period to allow time for the
required investigation."i8 Precedents to date are unclear on
whether the statute is substantive and thus applicable in federal
trial courts hearing Florida medical negligence claims."9
E. Virgin Islands Medical Malpractice
In the Virgin Islands there is a Medical Malpractice Action
Review Committee that, within the Office of the Commissioner
of Health, arranges for the review of all prospective "malprac-
tice" claims by experts before civil actions may be commenced. 2 9
notice of intent to initiate litigation).




116. See id. Similarly, in the prelawsuit stage where a claimant's notice to a
potential defendant of intent to initiate medical negligence litigation is accompanied by
"a verified written medical expert opinion," id. § 766.203(2)(b), the expert herself and
other matters pertaining to her opinion may not be discovered. See ic § 766.205(4); see
also Watkins v. Rosenthal, 637 So. 2d 993 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
117. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104(1) (West Supp. 1997).
118. See id. § 766.104(2).
119. Compare Teel v. United Techs. Pratt & Whitney, 953 F. Supp 1534 (S.D. Fla.
1997) (noting Florida's statute regarding pleading of punitive damages is substantive
for Erie doctrine purposes), with Tutor Time Child Care Sys., Inc. v. Franks Inv.
Group, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1188 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding Florida's statute inapplicable
in a diversity case).
120. See V.I. CoDE ANN. tib., 27 § 166i(a) (1997). Case law has determined the only
purpose of the Committee is to obtain expert review of all malpractice claims, so no
meeting is needed. See Quinones v. Charles Harwood Meml. Hasp., 573 F. Supp. 1101,
1102 (V.I. 1983).
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Depending on the circumstances, the committee may include the
commissioner of insurance, the president of the Virgin Islands
Bar Association or a designee, the president of the Virgin Islands
Medical Society or a designee, and the president of the Virgin
Islands Nurses' Association or a designee.1"' A claimant must file
a "proposed complaint," 2 which is sent to each named defen-
dant, who "may" file a proposed answer.' The Committee deter-
mines what expertise is necessary' and arranges for expert
review.? The expert must examine "the medical records and the
legal papers submitted" and may examine the claimant if the
Committee deems it necessary.126 The expert then must submit
in writing an opinion "concerning whether or not the defendant
acted or failed to act within the appropriate standards of medical
care."12 The cost of obtaining the expert opinion is funded by the
Medical Expert Fund.? The Committee has the power to obtain
"all necessary information from health care providers" and to
examine preexisting health care reports as "necessary."'29 A
health care provider, other than a hospital, who refuses to com-
ply with the requests for information is subject to disciplinary
action by the appropriate licensing board.130 The expert opinion
is immediately forwarded to the parties and is available to either
party in a subsequent civil action, although if either party wishes
to call the expert as a witness, "the party must do so at his own
cost."'3 ' The Committee members receive absolute civil immunity
for their participation in this process within the scope of their
statutory duties.13 A claimant may proceed whatever the results
of the Committee's expert report, as the goals of the law are to
encourage withdrawal of potential claims without merit and to
encourage settlement where potential claims have merit.
133
121. See title 27, § 166i(a).
122. Id. § 166i(b).
123. Id. § 166i(c).
124. See id. § 166i(d).
125. See id § 166i(d)(1).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See ida § 166i(d)(3). The Medical Expert Fund was created, V.I. CODE ANN. tit.
33, § 3042 (1975), expressly to pay for the expert opinions required in medical
malpractice claims.
129. Title 27, § 166i(d)(2).
130. See id. (appropriate discipline may be license suspension or revocation).
131. Id. § 166i(d)(4).
132. See id § 166i(e).
133. See, e.g., Abdallah v. Calender, 1 F.3d 141, 145 (3rd Cir. 1993) (citing Berry
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F. Georgia Professional Malpractice
A Georgia statute requires a certificate of merit in civil ac-
tions for "professional malpractice."13 These actions involve pro-
fessionals who are recognized by state statute as involved in
certain occupations or who are regulated by state examining
boards where licensure is predicated on specialized training.'3 5
The required certificate is an affidavit of an expert who is compe-
tent to testify and who sets forth specifically at least one rele-
vant negligent act or omission and its factual basis.136 Case law
has established that affidavits are only needed when the defen-
dants fail in "expert judgment and skill," and not where profes-
sionals fail in their "administrative, clerical, or routine" acts. 37
Safeguards are in place for statute of limitations problems.
138
Dismissal can occur if there is a failure to file, and pleading defi-
ciencies can not be cured by amendment unless the claimant had
the requisite affidavit available prior to filing and the failure to
file was due to a mistake.1 39 The statute so far has been regarded
as procedural and thus applicable only to claims filed in Georgia
state trial courts."4°
v. Curreri, 837 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1988)).
134. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1(a) (1993) (amended 1996); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A.53A-27 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring expert affidavit after complaint and answer
are filed "[in any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death or property
damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed
person").
135. See Lutz v. Foran, 427 S.E.2d 248 (Ga. 1993). Professionals include licensed
pharmacists, Harrell v. Lusk, 439 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. 1994); physical therapists, Hodo v.
General Hosp., 438 S.E.2d 378 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); pest controllers, Colston v. Fred's
Pest Control, Inc., 436 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); and real estate brokers, Allen v.
Remax North Atlanta, Inc., 445 S.E.2d 774 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
136. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1(a) (1993) (amended 1996); cf. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A.53A-27 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring an affidavit of "an appropriate licensed
person that there exists a reasonable probability" that defendant's care "fell outside
acceptable professional or occupational standards").
137. Lutz, 427 S.E.2d at 250.
138. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1(b) (1993) (amended 1996).
139. See id. § 9-11-9.1(e).
140. See Boone v. Knight, 131 F.R.D. 609, 611 (S.D. Ga. 1990). The court cited the
Erie doctrine and stated federal courts are bound only by substantive not procedural
laws of the states. See id. at 610. Relying on Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965),
the court stated: The Hanna decision makes clear that Erie does not require the
federal courts to depart from the Federal Rules in cases where those rules conflict with
state law, even if the state law is in some sense 'substantive.'" Boone, 131 F.R.D. at
611. The court found the statute at issue to be essentially a pleading requirement
based partly on the fact that it was codified in the state's civil procedure code. See id.
Additionally, the court found the pleading requirements to be in conflict with Federal
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G. California Childhood Sexual Abuse
In California, any plaintiff twenty-six or older who files a
civil action for damages suffered from childhood sexual abuse
must file two certificates with the complaint. 4' The plaintiff's
attorney and a licensed mental health practitioner must each
certify that there is a "reasonable" basis for the action. 4 2 The
mental health practitioner must certify that she is not a party to
the action, is not treating and has not treated the plaintiff, but
has interviewed the plaintiff and has concluded "there is a rea-
sonable basis to believe that the plaintiff had been subject to
childhood sexual abuse.""4 The complaint may not be served
upon any defendant until the court, in camera, reviews the cer-
tificates and determines "there is a reasonable and meritorious
cause for the filing of the action."' 44 Furthermore, the complaint
initially must name any defendant only by a Doe designation.'
Plaintiff may apply to the court for permission to substitute the
actual name of any defendant by submitting "a certificate of
corroborative fact executed by the attorney for the plaintiff."46
This certificate must set forth the nature and substance of the
corroborative fact, and, if the fact is supported by testimony of a
witness or contents of a document, their identity and location
Rule 8, which requires the plaintiff to set forth "a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 8).
141. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(e) (West 1986) (amended 1994) (requiring
certificate of attorney and licensed mental health practitioner); cf LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2800.9(B) (West Supp. 1997) (stating certificate of merit required by attorney and
licensed mental health practitioner for every plaintiff 21 years of age or older in
actions for sexual abuse of a minor or physical abuse of a minor resulting in permanent
impairment, injury, or scarring). The California provision typically applies only to
repressed memory claims as the limitations period on childhood sexual abuse claims
where there were no repressed memories expires at the age of 26. CAL. CIV. PRoc.
CODE § 340.1(a) (West 1997).
142. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(e)(1), (2) (West 1997).
143. Id. § 340.1(e)(2); cf. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9(B)(1) (West 1993) (amended
1995) (stating the expert consulted may not be a party to the litigation, but the
provision does not address whether the expert may be the treating mental health
practitioner).
144. CAL. Cirv. PRoc. CODE § 340.1(g) (West 1997).
145. See id. § 340.1(j). In Louisiana, the plaintiff may not name the defendant
until the court has determined, in camera, based on the certificate of merit filed with
the complaint, that there is a reasonable and meritorious cause for filing. The
defendants name may be added at such time and the duty to give notice then attaches.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9(D) (West Supp. 1997).
146. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 340.1(k) (West 1997).
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must be indicated." 7 The court reviews the certificate of corrobo-
rative fact, in camera, and determines whether one or more facts
corroborate the allegation; if so, the court allows the complaint
to be amended to substitute the defendant's name. 4 ' The court
maintains all certificates of corroborative fact "under seal and
confidential from the public and all parties to the litigation."1 9
Failure to file certificates of merit may result in a demurrer or a
motion to strike, 50 and "violation" of the statute by an attorney
may be grounds for professional discipline.' 5 ' If a defendant
against whom a certificate was filed prevails, the court may ver-
ify the plaintiff's compliance with the certification standards by
requiring the plaintiff's attorney to disclose the name, address,
and telephone number of the consulting expert. 52 The court re-
views the information, in camera, to determine if there has been
a failure to comply,' with noncompliance possibly resulting in
an order that the offending party or party's attorney pay defen-
dant's reasonable expenses, including attorney fees.' 5"
IV. A uRmnUEs OF EXPERT OPINION PLEADING
Because the use of certificates of merit involving an expert
opinion is a relatively new form of special pleading requirement
that is quite distinct from other special pleading rules, general
discovery rules, and general pleading certification standards,
some of the certificates of merit's most distinctive attributes will
now be examined. These attributes include the breadth of cover-
age, the presentation of the expert opinion through consultation
or report, the opportunity for prefiling information gathering,
and the sanctions available upon noncompliance.
147. See id. § 340.1(k)(1).
148. See id. § 340.1(1).
149. Id. § 340.1(m).
150. See id. § 340.1(i).
151. Id. § 340.1(h). In Louisiana, a violation may be grounds for discipline against
the attorney, but there is not a provision to disclose the identity of the consulting
expert to establish failure to comply and sanction the party or party's attorney. See LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9(E) (West Supp. 1997).





Expert opinion pleading provisions usually apply to a narrow
range of specific claims, although exemptions are sometimes
recognized. There are several expert opinion pleading laws in the
areas of professional negligence or malpractice, and their
breadth of coverage and enumerated exceptions vary widely. For
example, in Illinois a certificate of merit is required in all civil
actions for "healing art malpractice," including actions involving
"tort, contract or otherwise."155 The relevant statute specifically
includes claims involving the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur' 56
Case law has determined that Illinois healing art malpractice
includes actions where a hospital negligently allowed a doctor to
use a device on which the FDA had withdrawn approval,'57
where a hospital negligently restrained a partially paralyzed
patient who fell out of bed,5 s and where an ambulance service
negligently failed to provide equipment.159 However, Illinois case
law has also determined healing art malpractice does not include
actions where a hospital negligently allowed liquid to accumulate
on the floor, 60 where a nursing home resident fell out of a wheel
chair while trying to get out on his own,'16 and where a wrongful
death action was based on the death of an inmate.
6 2
155. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(a) (West 1997). But see Comfort v. Wheaton
Family Practice, 594 N.E.2d 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (holding no affidavit needed for
claim against medical partnership based on vicarious liability for medical malpractice
of employee and agent); see generally supra Part III.C.
156. See title 735, 5/2-622(c).
157. See Kus v. Sherman Hosp., 561 N.E.2d. 381 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (reasoning
negligence was based on conduct requiring medical knowledge, and thus action was not
for administrative hospital negligence).
158. See Kolanowski v. Illinois Valley Community Hosp., 544 N.E.2d 821 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1989) (reasoning medical judgment was involved, and that hospital's failure to
provide adequate restraints, including bed rails, could be established only upon expert
testimony).
159. See Lyon by Lyon v. Hasbro Indus., Inc., 509 N.E.2d 702, 706 (Ill. App. Ct.
1987) (holding that a determination of which equipment is needed to facilitate
emergency health care is "inherently one of medical judgment").
160. See Mooney v. Graham Hosp. Ass'n, 513 N.E.2d 633, 636 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(holding that healing art claims do not include "ordinary premises liability claims").
161. See Owens v. Manor Health Care Corp., 512 N.E.2d 820 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)
(reasoning medical diagnosis or treatment was not involved, but rather only "custodial
shelter," whose standards would not be established by expert testimony).
162. See Freeman v. Fairman, 916 F. Supp. 786 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (reasoning
plaintiffs had not sued any physicians and that claims were founded on a breach of the
jailor's duty of due care).
565537]
566 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1997
By contrast, the New York certificate of merit requirement
for medical malpractice actions distinguishes negligence from
medical malpractice claims, l63 exempts claims pursued pro se,164
and excludes actions based solely on res ipsa loquitur. 65 And in
Texas, a certificate of merit is required in "health care liability"
claims, 66 but is limitBd to issues "relating to liability or causa-
tion."167 In North Dakota, the expert opinion pleading standard
covers "professional negligence" claims only against a North
Dakota licensed "physician, nurse or hospital," and specifically
excludes allegations as to "lack of informed consent, uninten-
tional failure to remove a foreign substance from within the body
of a patient, or performance of a medical procedure upon the
wrong patient, organ, limb or other part of the patient's body, or
other obvious occurrence." 68
Other certificate of merit provisions cover very broad areas of
professional negligence and malpractice, and are often unclear
about when certificates are needed. In Missouri, a certificate is
required in any action against a health care provider that seeks
damages for "personal injury or death on account of the render-
ing of or failing to render health care services."6 9 Case law has
determined this includes an action for libel"0 and an action for
163. See Safer & Vogelran, M.D.s v. Kalvin, 579 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. App. Term.
1991) (holding doctor's failure to advise patient prior to surgery not to take aspirin on
day of scheduled surgery required no certificate of merit as claim was for negligence
rather than malpractice); cf mICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600-2912(d)(1) (West Supp. 1996)
(requiring certificate of merit in actions alleging medical malpractice).
164. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a(f) (McKinney 1991) (waiving the requirement for a
"plaintiff who is not represented by an attorney").
165. See id. 3012-a(c).
166. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(a) (West Supp. 1997).
167. Id. § 13.01(j).
168. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (1991).
169. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225 (West 1988); see also, e.g., Mullins v. Miller, 796
S.W.2d 119 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) (holding affidavit of merit needed, notwithstanding that
dentist's obligation to supply dentures arose out of contract), overruled on other
grounds by Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., 807 S.W.2d 503 (Mo. 1991); compare
FLA. STAT. ch. 766.104(1) (1986) (amended 1995) (addressing actions for "personal injury
or wrongful death arising out of medical negligence, whether in tort or in contract"),
and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682(2) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring certificate of merit in
action against health care provider alleging "malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to
cure, whether based on contract or tort"), with Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 508 (holding
that "implicitly" the statutory procedure does not require an expert opinion when the
civil action is "untypical" in that it "does not require proof of standard of care").
170. See Vitale v. Sandow, 912 S.W.2d 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding libel action
against doctor who diagnosed patient as "malingering" requires expert affidavit as claim
is for misdiagnosis).
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false imprisonment. 7' Missouri case law has also determined a
nursing home falls within the meaning of "health care pro-
vider."" 2 Even broader and similarly uncertain, a Georgia stat-
ute requires an expert's affidavit for any damages action alleging
"professional malpractice." 7 '
Outside the professional negligence and malpractice arenas,
there are fewer expert opinion pleading laws. But here too the
scope of coverage is difficult to discern. For example, in Illinois, a
certificate is required in any "product liability action" in which
plaintiff seeks "damage for harm."74 And in both California 75
and Louisiana,' certificates are required for certain civil claims
involving "sexual abuse."
B. The Expert Opinion
An important attribute of many special certificate of merit
laws involves the expert opinion, which may be rendered after
oral consultation or which, at times, must appear in a written
document that is usually either in the form of a report or an
affidavit. Within the requirements for an expert opinion, states
have taken different approaches to the roles of the claimant or
claimant's attorney, the identity of the expert, the qualifications
of the expert, the matters certified or reviewed by the expert, the
171. See St. John's Reg'l Health Ctr., Inc. v. Winder, 847 S.W.2d 168 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1993) (holding affidavit needed where there are allegations of false imprisonment
against doctor and nurse in their capacities as health care providers). But see Morrison
v. St. Luke's Health Corp., 929 S.W.2d 898, 905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding affidavit
required for claim of false imprisonment only where plaintiff's "true claim" was false
imprisonment caused by incorrect medical determination that she needed to be
confined).
172. See Ferrier-Harris, Ltd. v. Sanders, 905 S.W.2d 123 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
173. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1987) (amended 1996); see, e.g., Richmond Leasing
Co. v. Cooper, Cooper, Maioriello & Stalnaker, 428 S.E.2d 603 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding action against attorney for negligent legal representation in bankruptcy
proceedings required expert affidavit).
174. 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-623 (West 1996); see also Tort Law, supra note
76, at 705 (finding Illinois product liability law either "ineffective or quixotically
burdensome" because of its "vagueness"). Illinois case law has determined an affidavit
is not required when an employee of a truck repair company was injured by a truck
on employer's premises even though product liability actions include those against
persons who repair products. See Gozenpud v. Crown Controls Corp., 897 F. Supp. 372
(N.D. Ill. 1995). The court reasoned the truck involved was not in the stream of
commerce so the statute did not apply;, see id. at 374; see also supra Part III.B.
175. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(d) (West 1986) (amended 1994); see also
supra Part III.G.
176. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9(B)(2) (West 1993) (amended 1995).
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necessary strength of the expert's conviction, and the timing of
the expert opinion.
Significant variations exist among the states regarding the
roles of the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney in the expert opinion
process. For Illinois civil actions involving healing art malprac-
tice, the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney must submit an affidavit
that she has consulted and reviewed the facts of the case with a
qualified expert and has concluded on the basis of this review
that "there is a reasonable and meritorious cause" for filing the
action.' The plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney must also attach the
expert's report to the pleading.178 In contrast, the New York stat-
ute on certificates of merit in medical malpractice actions 179 and
the California statute on certificates in professional negligence
claims against architects, engineers, and land surveyors8 0 usu-
ally require only the attorney's affidavit regarding the consulta-
tion, '' and in the case of the New York statute, only when the
plaintiff is represented by an attorney.8 2 In California and New
York, there is no provision requiring any consulting expert's
report to be attached to a pleading, or even that a written report
be made. In Missouri, the plaintiff or her attorney must file an
affidavit stating she has obtained a written opinion of an expert
but the written opinion need not be attached.'83 In other states,
the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney need not even submit a spe-
cial affidavit certifying the merits or the consultation, but must
only attach to a pleading an expert's report certifying the merits
of the claim.'84
177. 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(a)(1) (West 1993) (amended 1996); see also
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9(B)(1) (West 1993) (amended 1995) (requiring, in certain
actions involving abuse of a minor, attorney to o)nsult with expert and conclude "there
is reasonable and meritorious cause for the filing"); supra Part 11I.C.
178. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 512-622(a)(1) (West 1993) (amended 1996); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9(B) (West 1993) (amended 1995) (requiring, in certain actions
involving abuse of a minor, attorney to attach her own certificate of merit as well as
a merit certificate by an expert to petition).
179. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a(a) (McKinney 1991).
180. See CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 411.35 (West Supp. I 1997).
181. See id § 411.35(b)(1); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a(a) (McKinney 1991).
182. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a(f) (McKinney 1991). But cf CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-190a(a) (West 1991) (requiring a certificate by attorney or party filing the action);
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(o) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring plaintiff
proceeding pro se to file an affidavit).
183. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225(1) (West 1988).
184. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602(A) (West Supp. 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-
11-9.1 (1987) (amended 1996); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2912d (West Supp. 1996).
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American legislatures have taken at least three basic ap-
proaches regarding the disclosure of an expert's identity. First,
some jurisdictions require that the expert's report contain the
name and address of the reviewing expert."5 Second, other juris-
dictions do not require that the claimant disclose the name of the
reviewing expert, even though an expert has been consulted
regarding the merits of the claim. 8 6 The third approach involves
two steps. The claimant first files an affidavit that need not in-
clude the name of the expert, then, within 180 days after filing,
the claimant must send each defendant a report containing the
names of the experts who will testify at trial.817 Here, it appears
the claimant need not disclose the name of the reviewing expert
unless that expert will testify. A variation on the third approach
requires an expert report to be filed within 90 days of the filing
of the pleading; within 180 days of the filing of the pleading the
plaintiff must "furnish to counsel for each physician or health
care provider one or more expert reports, with a curriculum vi-
tae of each expert listed in the report."' With this approach, the
expert report "is not admissible in evidence by a defendant"; the
report can not be used in a deposition, trial, or other proceeding;
and the defendant may not refer to the report for any purpose.
8 9
Regarding the qualifications required of the certifying or
consulting experts, some laws require higher qualifications than
found under evidence rules, while others require similar qualifi-
cations. Consider Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which states a
witness may be qualified as an expert "by knowledge, skill, expe-
rience, training, or education."190 The Texas certificate of merit
standard for healing art malpractice claims goes beyond this by
requiring that the consulting expert in a health care liability
case against a physician be a practitioner of medicine when the
claim arose or when the testimony was given.' 9' Similarly, for an
185. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 1993) (amended 1996)
(healing art malpractice); id. at 5/2-623 (product liability); V.I. CODE. ANN. tit. 27,
§ 166i(d) (1975) (amended 1993) (requiring expert appointed by a governmental agency
to review medical malpractice claims).
186. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602(3) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-190a(a) (West 1991); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a(e) (McKinney
1991).
187. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997).
188. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(a), (d)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
189. Id. § 13.01(k).
190. FED. R. EvD. 702.
191. See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 14.01(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
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Illinois certificate of merit in a healing art malpractice case, the
consulting expert must have practiced or taught in the relevant
area within the past six years.192 In Missouri, the consulting
expert must simply be a "legally qualified health care pro-
vider."'93 In Arizona, Michigan, and Georgia, the expert is de-
fined under evidence law standards. 4 In Minnesota, the expert's
qualifications "must provide a reasonable expectation that the
expert's opinions could be admissible at trial."'95 In New York,
the expert must be "licensed to practice in ... any state."96 For
Illinois product liability claims, the expert must have "scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge regarding the product
at issue or similar products" and must be "qualified to prepare
the report."9 ' And for California childhood sexual abuse claims,
the consulting licensed mental health practitioner selected by
the claimant simply may not be treating or have treated the
claimant.
198
Standards vary significantly regarding what the consulting
expert must certify or review. For example, Illinois statutes are
quite demanding. In the healing art malpractice area, Illinois
requires the consulting expert to conclude that there is "cause?'
to file the action.9 9 Furthermore, if the action involves res ipsa
loquitur, the expert must conclude negligence occurred in the
course of medical treatment; 00 if the action involves failure to
inform a patient of consequences, the expert must conclude the
defendant breached the standard of care.20' The Illinois product
liability certificate of merit standard requires even more. In
varying settings, the expert must identify "specific defects in the
product that have a potential for harm beyond that which would
192. See 735 ILL. CoMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (a)(1)(ii) (West 1996).
193. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 528.225 (West 1988).
194. See AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602(A) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring expert
to be one competent to testify); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1987) (amended 1996)
(requiring an expert to be one competent to testify); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.2912d (West Supp. 1996) (requiring that the expert "meet the requirements for
an expert witness").
195. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682(3)(a) (West Supp. 1997).
196. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a(a)(1) (McKinney 1991).
197. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-623(c) (West 1996); see also supra Part III.B.
198. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.1(e)(2) (West 1986) (amended 1994); see also
supra Part III.G.
199. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(a)(1) (West 1993) (amended 1996).
200. See id. at 5/2-622(c).
201. See id. at 5/2-622(d).
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be objectively contemplated by the ordinary user,"" 2 determine
defects were present in the product when it left the manufac-
turer's control,03 determine that there was a feasible alternative
design available that existed when the product left the manufac-
turer's control,0 4 or determine the defect was the proximate
cause of injury.205 By contrast, in a Michigan medical malpractice
action the expert must simply give a statement as to the stan-
dard of care, that the standard was breached, what compliance
with the standard should have entailed, and the manner in
which the breach was the proximate cause of injury.206 The Geor-
gia professional malpractice statute requires only that the expert
set forth at least one negligent act or omission alleged to exist
and its underlying factual basis.0 7 In Florida, the written opin-
ion of the expert, which need not be attached to the complaint,
must state that there is an indication of "medical negligence."20 8
And in Colorado, the expert opinion need only conclude that "the
filing of the claim.., does not lack substantial justification."2 9
Regarding the necessary strength of the expert's conviction,
the standards range from quite demanding to very relaxed.
Thus, in Illinois, experts involved in certifying healing art mal-
practice claims must find "there is a reasonable and meritorious
202. Id. at 5/2-623(a)(1)(A)(i).
203. See id. at 5/2-623(a)(1)(A)(ii).
204. See id. at 5/2-623(b).
205. See id. at 5/2-623(a)(1)(C); see also, e.g., Irizarry v. Digital Equip. Corp., 919
F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding affidavit was inadequate in suit for an injury
caused by a computer keyboard where the attorney merely consulted with an expert
regarding the type of keyboard used, did not state any facts such as the frequency and
duration of plaintiff's use of the keyboard, did not state the manner in which plaintiff
used the keyboard, did not state other possible medical conditions that could have led
to plaintiff's injuries, and where the expert report failed to determine the defective
product was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries).
206. See MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2912d (West Supp. 1996); see also TEX. REV.
Cxv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01(r)(6) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring that expert state
standard of care, manner breached, and proximate cause); cf MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 145.682(3) (West 1989 & Supp. 1997) (requiring that expert state one or more
defendants deviated from standard of care and by that action caused injury to
plaintiff); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225 (West 1988) (requiring that expert conclude
defendant breached the standard of care and such breach was the proximate cause of
plaintiff's injury).
207. See GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1(a) (1987) (amended 1996); see also ARIZ. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2602(A) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring statement of facts on which each
claim is based, factual basis for each claim, and causation).
208. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104(1) (West Supp. 1997).
209. COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602(3)(a)(II) (West Supp. 1996).
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cause" for the filing.2" Yet, experts who certify product liability
claims must make specific identifications21' and determina-
tions.21 '2 By contrast, in Florida experts involved in reviewing
medical negligence claims must simply find that "there appears
to be evidence of medfical negligence, 213 while in Louisiana ex-
perts in child abuse civil claims must conclude "there is a reason-
able basis to believe that the plaintiff has been subject to crimi-
nal sexual activity or physical abuse" during childhood.1 4
Standards also vary regarding the timing of the claimant's
procurement of an expert opinion.215 Occasionally, an expert
opinion must be procured before a claim is even filed in a civil
trial court because consultation with an expert is a prerequisite
to the claimant's compelled prefiling notice of a proposed
claim.21 6 Where such presuit notice is not demanded, evidence of
consultation with an expert often is required for any initial
pleading.217 The evidence involving the certification of the claim's
merit may, but need not, involve a written expert report pre-
sented with the initial pleading.218 By contrast, some certificate
210. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(a)(1) (West 1993) (amended 1996).
211. See, e.g., id. at 5/2-623(a)(1)(A)(i) (requiring that, in action based on strict
liability in tort or implied warranty, expert report "identify" specific product defects
having certain potential for harm).
212. See id. at 5/2-623(a)(1)(A)(ii) (requiring that, in action based on strict liability
in tort or implied warranty, expert report contain a "determination" on product's
unreasonable danger and defective condition at time product left manufacturer's
control).
213. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104(1) (West Supp. 1997); see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-190a(a) (West 1991).
214. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9(B)(2) (West 1993) (amended 1995).
215. Procurement of an expert opinion is essential to a pleading seeking relief for
such designated claims as medical malpractice, professional malpractice, product
liability, and sexual abuse.
216. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(2) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring that
notification of intent to initiate medical malpractice litigation include claimant's
"submission of a verified written medical expert opinion . . . which . . . shall
corroborate reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence"); cf MICH.
Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.2912b(4) (West Supp. 1996) (stating that presuit notice of
medical malpractice claim need not include expert opinion, but must contain claimant's
statements on the applicable standard of care, its breach, and how the breach could
have been avoided, all of which often are aided by consultation with an expert); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit. 27, § 166i (1975) (amended 1993) (requiring review by governmental
committee of experts before claim may be filed).
217. See 735 ILL. COmP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-623(a)(1) (West 1997) (requiring affidavit
stating case was reviewed with a qualified expert).
218. Compare, e.g., id. at 5/2-622(a)(1) (amended 1996) (requiring that, for healing
art malpractice claim, expert's written report be attached to a claimant's or a
claimant's lawyer's affidavit accompanying a pleading), with N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a(a), (e)
(McKinney 1991) (requiring that, for medical, dental or podiatric claim, claimant's
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of merit pleading standards require evidence of an expert report
only some time shortly after the initial relevant pleading is pre-
sented, as within a certain time period from when the initial
pleading was filed or when it was answered.219
C. Prefiling Information Gathering
State certificate of merit standards differ in their treatment
of the opportunity for prefiling information gathering allowed to
the claimant or her lawyer to assist in complying with the
heightened pleading demands. For example, many certificate of
merit laws for medical malpractice actions allow the claimant an
opportunity to copy her medical records and grant the claimant
an extension of time in which to file the certificate if the records
are not provided. 22' The Florida provision requires full coopera-
tion in "providing informal discovery" related to the filing of the
certificate of merit.221 Other certificate of merit statutes do not
mention an opportunity for prefiling information gathering.222 In
these states, lawmakers may have presumed that a person al-
ways has access to relevant information, such as to her medical
records in medical malpractice actions or to the product in prod-
uct liability actions.2
Some states require prefiling notice of medical malpractice
claims and, within these notice requirements, provide for infor-
mal prefiling information gathering. In Michigan, for example,
prefiling notice of a claim must usually occur 182 days prior to
attorney need only certify that there has been consultation with an expert, with no
duty to disclose the expert's identity).
219. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1996) (60
days after service of process); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2Ak53A-27 (West Supp. 1996) (60 days
after answer to complaint); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (1991) (usually 3 months after
action commenced).
220. See 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 1993) (amended 1996); MICH.
COMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.2912d (West Supp. 1996); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney
1991); cf N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2Az53A-29 (West Supp. 1996) (stating that the expert
affidavit required for "certain actions against licensed persons" is unnecessary where
claimant provides sworn statement showing defendant has failed to provide relevant
medical records).
221. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104(1) (West Supp. 1997). The provision in section 2
allows plaintiff an extension of time to conduct a reasonable investigation. See also
supra Part III.D.
222. See e.g. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1993) (amended 1996); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/2-623 (West 1997).
223. But see 735 ILL. COMEP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-623(a)(2) (West 1993) (amended 1996)
(allowing product liability claimant an extension of time in which to file the affidavit
if defendant prevented inspection or nondestructive testing of the product at issue).
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the filing of the action,224 although the period can be reduced to
91 days under certain circumstances.2" Within 56 days after
giving notice, the statute commands that the claimant shall al-
low those notified parties access to medical records relevant to
the claim and within the claimant's control.226 After 56 days from
receipt of notice, the defending health professional or facilities
shall allow the claimant access to related records that are in
their control.227 Within 154 days of receipt of the notice of the
claim, the health professionals or facilities must respond in writ-
ing on the factual basis for any defense to the claim, the applica-
ble standard of care and the defendant's compliance, and why
the alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of the claim-
ant's injury.2" A civil action may be commenced before the notice
period expires if the health professional or facility informs claim-
ant it does not intend to settle. 229 The statute of limitations for
the civil action tolls during the notice period.3 °
Florida, in addition to requiring prefiling notice, 23' also re-
quires a prenotice investigation of medical negligence claims and
defenses. 2 The prenotice investigation must establish there are
reasonable grounds to believe that any named defendant was
negligent in the care cf the claimant and that such negligence
resulted in injury to the claimant.3 3 The "reasonable grounds"
must be corroborated by a "verified written medical expert opin-
ion" submitted with the notice. 4 The prospective defendant or
defendant's insurer must then conduct an investigation to ascer-
tain whether there are reasonable grounds for the claim.235 Dur-
ing the presuit phase the parties are compelled to "make discov-
224. See MICH. COOP. LAws ANN. § 600.2912b(1), (4) (West Supp. 1996) (stating
that, while the notice need not be accompanied by an expert report or by an affidavit
of reasonable attorney inquiry or the like, it may be difficult to comply with the notice
standards without consultation with an expert as the notice must speak to such issues
as the manner in which the applicable standard of care was breached and the care
which should have been given).
225. See id. § 600.2912b(3).
226. See id. § 600.2912b(5).
227. See id.
228. See id. § 600.2912b(7).
229. See id. § 600.2912b(9).
230. See id. § 600.5856(d).
231. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106 (West Supp. 1997).
232. See id. § 766.203.
233. See id § 766.203(2).
234. Id.
235. See id. § 766.203(3).
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erable information available without formal discovery," with
failure to do so constituting "grounds for dismissal of claims or
defenses ultimately asserted."2 6 Informal discovery can be used
to obtain unsworn statements, 37 documents or things,238 or phys-
ical and mental examinations. 239 Requests must be in writing
with copies sent to all parties.240 No work product created in the
presuit process is discoverable or admissible "in any civil action
for any purpose by the opposing party."24' All participants have




A final attribute of certificate of merit laws involves sanc-
tions for noncompliance. Sanctions of varying types may be im-
posed on the party, the party's attorney, or the expert for a fail-
ure to file. The most serious sanction against a party is dismissal
of the pleading. In both the Illinois healing art malpractice243 and
product liability certificate of merit provisions ,244 "failure to
file ... shall be grounds for dismissal."24 Yet, reviewing courts
often liberally construe those provisions to allow leave to
amend.246 The Missouri statute provides the court may dismiss
the complaint without prejudice if the required affidavit is not
filed.247 In Minnesota there is a mandatory dismissal with preju-
dice if the required affidavit is not filed within sixty days of de-
mand.24 Some states also subject the noncomplying party to
monetary sanctions. 249 In other jurisdictions, plaintiff's attorneys
236. I& § 766.106(6).
237. See id. § 766.106(7)(a).
238. See id. § 766.106(7)(b).
239. See id. § 766.106(7)(c).
240. See id. § 766.106(8).
241. Id. § 766.106(5).
242. See id.
243. See supra Part Ill.C.
244. See supra Part III.B.
245. 735 ILL. COAMP. STAT. ANN. 512-623 (West 1996); id at 5/2-622 (amended 1996).
246. See Irizarry v. Digital Equip. Corp., 919 F. Supp. 301, 305 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
247. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225 (West 1988).
248. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682(6) (West 1989 & Supp. 1997); cf. GA. CODE
ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1987) (amended 1996) (stating that dismissal cannot be cured by
amendment unless failure to file was a mistake and plaintiff had the affidavit prior to
filing).
249. See, e.g., 735 InL. COIP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 1993) (amended 1996)
(providing that, for certificates containing bad faith allegations, a party, a party's
attorney, or both may be subject to money sanctions in the amount of reasonable costs
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are subject to monetary sanctions under some laws,"0 while still
other laws indicate noncompliance "may constitute unprofes-
sional conduct," which could lead to "discipline against the attor-
ney."25' Some certificate of merit provisions include immunity for
the expert in any civil action that may result in connection with
filing the certificate of merit.252 Perhaps where immunity is not
expressly recognized, an expert may be subject to liability in
connection with filing the expert report.
V. CONCERNS ABOUT EXPERT OPINION PLEADING
Certificates of merit involving an expert opinion that appear
within special pleading requirements raise two fundamental
questions. First, should there ever be such certificates? Second,
assuming there will be some certificates, how should they oper-
ate?
A. Rationales Disfavoring Expert Opinion Pleading Standards
There are at least three major concerns suggesting why
certificates of merit involving an expert opinion should never be
employed or should be employed sparingly. They are the lack of
an adequate empirical basis justifying the use of such provisions,
the lack of legislative authority, and the infringement of consti-
tutional rights.
1. No empirical basis?
New certificate of merit statutes should be enacted, if at all,
only after additional and adequate empirical bases justifying
their use have been established. To date, tort reform efforts have
been based largely on anecdotal reports, which are usually un-
supported empirically and thus create risks that new norms will
not address the real problems.253 One example of anecdotal justi-
and attorney's fees of the defending party).
250. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.682 (West 1989 & Supp. 1997); cf 735 ILL.
COP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622 (West 1993) (amended 1996) (providing for sanctions against
attorney or party when affidavit is made "without reasonable cause" and "found to be
untrue").
251. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.9(E) (West 1993) (amended 1995).
252. See, e.g., 735 ILL. CMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(f) (West 1993) (amended 1996).
253. See generally Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55
MD. L. REV. 1093, 1097 (1996) [hereinafter Real World Torts] (arguing "common-sense"
assertions "largely pass by the real problems of the tort system and offer flawed and
harmful prescriptions for change based on a misreading of the patterns, trends and
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fication for tort reform is found in the product liability area.
Powerful narratives about "outrageous" lawsuits, like the one
based on spilled coffee at a fast food restaurant, have convinced
many Americans that the civil justice system has spun out of
control. 4 Such narratives have prompted strong political dis-
course supporting significant product liability reform, where
product liability claims make up only a small portion of tort
cases nationally. 5 5 Aside from relying on anecdotes, product
liability reformers often cite survey reports of manufacturers as
well as the perceptions of CEOs on the effects of litigation, while
ignoring other surveys that "totally rejecti] the notion that there
[is] a major liability crisis.""6 More fruitful public debate and
reforms would result if empirical studies were more objectively
conducted and more comprehensively considered. Empirical data
may reveal there is no need for certificates of merit. In the area
of product liability, "serious investigation" arguably has revealed
litigation does not have a "significant effect on America's prosper-
ity.,,257
In the area of medical malpractice, a major purpose of plead-
ing reform is to reduce costs to the consumer by reducing expen-
ditures on "defensive medicine" in the form of unnecessary tests
and treatmentY. 8 But significant empirical evidence demonstrat-
ing the benefits of certificate of merit reforms in medical mal-
practice actions is still lacking,259 although there appear to be
significant costs incurred. Further, legislative initiatives occur
on the state front, though studies of what is happening in the
relevant state usually are unavailable and are not commissioned
prior to debates on reform. Can it truly be imagined that frivo-
lous medical malpractice claims are more common in Illinois,
where special certificate legislation has been implemented, than
in Wisconsin, where it has not; or that California's current law
reflects a greater incidence of frivolous claims against "archi-
tects, engineers and land surveyors" than against doctors?260
effects of litigation").
254. This perception has "displayed a remarkable resilience in occupying the public
forum and setting the terms of public debate." Id. at 1155.
255. See id. at 1109.
256. Id. at 1148.
257. Id. at 1145.
258. Id. at 1151.
259. See id. at 1149-53 (reviewing studies on medical malpractice reforms).
260. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 411.30 (West 1978) (repealed 1989) (1978 law
requiring certificate of merit in medical malpractice action), with CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE
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As President Clinton noted in the Presidential Debates,26'
tort reform efforts must aim to deter frivolous claims without
denying justice for claims with merit. It would be unfortunate to
initiate significant new pleading reforms without understanding
their effects, with the distinct prospect of reducing the rights of
the injured, and without some assurance that there will be a
reduction in the transaction costs or in harm to defendants.262
2. Proper exercise of legislative authority?
As special certificate of merit requirements usually operate
under statute and alter either the general pleading or the gen-
eral attorney conduct standards, or both, formulated in state
court rules, at least some of the requirements may be challenged
as undue infringements on state court rulemaking authority.
The challenges are most apt to be successful where the state
constitution expressly delegates to the state court broad
rulemaking powers over trial court practices or over the legal
profession, with the legislative role in civil procedure lawmaking
encompassing, at best, only oversight of judicial rulemaking ini-
tiatives and not independent initiatives. Such separation of pow-
ers challenges are illustrated by recent case developments in
Ohio and Illinois.
In Ohio, legislation at one time required that any pleading
setting forth "a medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic
claim" be supported by "documentation," usually involving an
affidavit by a claimant's attorney or by a pro se claimant, indi-
cating there had been consultation with an expert who deter-
mined, along with the affiant, that there was "a reasonable
cause" for the claim.2'3  As the affidavit was a prerequisite to
jurisdiction, its absence would lead to dismissal.2 However, in
Hiatt v. Southern Health Facilities, Inc.,265 the Ohio Supreme
Court recognized that the Ohio Constitution gives the court
rulemaking authority over "practice and procedure in all courts
of the state," limited only by the power of the general assembly
§ 411.35 (West Supp. 1997) (1979 law requiring certificate of merit in professional
negligence action against architect, engineer or land surveyor operative in the early
1990s).
261. See First Debate, supra note 1; Second Debate, supra note 1.
262. See Real World Torts, supra note 253, at 1142.
263. OHIO REV. CODE ANi. § 2307.42(c)(1)(a),) (Anderson 1995).
264. See id. § 2307.42(c)(3).
265. 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohic 1994).
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to adopt "a concurrent resolution of disapproval" of a proposed
high court rule.266 The court also noted that the Ohio Constitu-
tion declares that "all laws" in conflict with such a high court
general pleading rule "shall be of no further force or effect."
26 7
The special certificate requirement was found to be in conflict
with the general pleading rule declaring that pleadings "need not
be verified or accompanied by affidavit" except "when otherwise
specifically provided" by high court rules.268 Therefore, the legis-
lation was held invalid.26 s
Illinois legislation similarly requires that a pleading setting
forth a claim arising out of "medical, hospital or other healing
art malpractice" usually be accompanied by an affidavit of the
claimant's attorney or a pro se claimant indicating that the affi-
ant has "consulted and reviewed the facts" with a qualified
health professional and that both the consultant and the affiant
have determined "that there is a reasonable and meritorious
cause" for the filing.270 However, in contrast to Ohio, in Illinois
there is no explicit state constitutional provision recognizing and
guiding state court civil procedure rulemaking. In fact, the Illi-
nois high court has consistently found that "the legislature may,
consistent with the separation of powers principle, impose re-
quirements governing matters of procedure and the presentation
of claims," even where noncompliance with these requirements
can result in claim dismissal.271 Further, the Illinois general
pleading rule, unlike its Ohio counterpart, specifically states
that legislation may provide that pleadings "be verified or ac-
companied by affidavit."2 72 Therefore, in contrast to the Ohio
266. Oio CONsT. art. IV, § 5(B). For a review of Ohio Supreme Court rulemaking
authority, see Jeffrey A. Parness & Christopher C. Manthey, Public Process and Ohio
Supreme Court Rulemaking, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 249 (1979).
267. Ouo CONST. art. IV, § 5(B).
268. OIo R. Cw. P. 11.
269. See Hiatt, 626 N.E.2d at 71.
270. 735 ILL. Coip. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(a)(1) (West 1993) (amended 1996).
271. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1146 (Ill. 1992). For a
review of Illinois Supreme Court rulemaking authority, see Jeffrey A. Parness and
Bruce Elliot Keller, Increased and Accessible Illinois Judicial Rulemaking, 8 N. ILL. U.
L. REV. 817 (1988).
272. ILL. Sup. Or. R. 137. Had the healing art malpractice provisions on attorney
affidavits been deemed as a means of assuring compliance with ethical constraints on
attorneys, then they may have been subject to characterization as provisions on
attorney discipline which improperly transgressed upon the high court's "sole authority
to regulate and discipline attorney conduct." People ex rel. Brazen v. Finley, 519 N.E.2d
898, 901 (Il1. 1988).
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legislation, the Illinois law was sustained by the Illinois Su-
preme Court as a rational provision governing trial court proce-
dure in DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital273 upon a constitu-
tional challenge founded, in part, upon separation of powers
concerns. 
274
The Ohio and Illinois precedents demonstrate state statutory
certificate of merit requirements may fall outside the scope of
proper legislative authority as infringements on judicial
rulemaking authority. Transgressions might occur in the trial
court practice and procedure area or in the regulation of the
practice of law area, as the requirements typically address
pleading standards275 and demand certain prefiling attorney
work product.276
Other separation of powers challenges have been raised to
certain special certificate of merit requirements. For example,
undue infringement on judicial functions was alleged in DeLuna
regarding the law that requires that, prior to filing a healing art
malpractice claim, a consulting health professional prepare a
273. 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1147 (Ill. 1992). By contrast, a dissenting justice
characterized the law as governing legal and factual decision making on the merits of
the claim, unduly burdensome on "the judiciary's exercise of its inherent judicial
powers," and thus unconstitutional under the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at
1150-51 (Clark, J., dissenting).
274. See id. at 1144-45 (finding no conflict between legislation and high court rule
and no improper grant of a judicial power to a health care professional); see also
McAlister v. Schick, 588 N.E.2d 1151, 1156 (l. 1992) (finding legislation may regulate
a trial court's practice so long as it does not dictate how it must adjudicate and apply
the law and it does not conflict with judicial control over procedures).
275. Beyond Ohio, where earlier or later laws in conflict with a rule on pleadings
accompanied by affidavits have no force or effect, and illinois, where later laws on
pleadings accompanied by affidavits may have effect though different from an earlier
rule, there are other variations in the legislative~udicial interplay over trial court
practice and procedure standards. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a) (stating Supreme
Court practice and procedure rules may be adopted without referral to the legislature,
but such rules may be repealed by general law enacted by two-thirds vote of
membership of each house of the legislature); MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(3) (stating
practice and procedure rules subject to legislative disapproval in either of the two
sessions following promulgation).
276. If certificates of merit are characterized as lawyer conduct standards,
infringements generally will more likely be found, as state high courts are more likely
to possess greater, if not exclusive, rulemaking authority. Thus, in Ohio, proposed
practice and procedure rules for trial courts are submitted for General Assembly review
while professional responsibility rules are not. See OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5. And in
Illinois, the high court claims it has "sole authority to regulate and discipline attorney
conduct" arising from its inherent power, Brazen, 519 N.E.2d at 901, while recognizing
its trial court practice and procedure rules may be supplemented by statutes, as long
as they do not dictate how a court "must adjudicate and apply the law or conflict with
a court's right to control its procedures." McAlister, 588 N.E.2d at 1156.
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report determining the claim is meritorious. A dissenting justice
found the provision unconstitutional, as it empowered the expert
to assess the merits of a claim, an inherently judicial function,
with the absence of such an assessment necessarily resulting in
a dismissal.277 The majority, however, found no exercise of judi-
cial power as the expert was not asked to render views concern-
ing the outcome of the suit, but was only asked to do what would
otherwise be done at trial, though the majority conceded an ex-
pert may not always be needed at trial.27
3. Infringement on constitutional rights?
Beyond separation of powers issues involving state court
rulemaking and judicial functions, individual rights concerns
occasionally have been raised in challenges to certificate of merit
requirements. Relevant constitutional rights arise under both
the federal and state constitutions. To date, these challenges
ha;e been largely unsuccessful.279
Federal constitutional challenges often involve equal protec-
tion claims since certificate of merit standards treat differently
malpractice, product liability, or other specified claimants from
all other claimants. To secure a stricter standard of scrutiny,
challengers have urged that certificate of merit standards un-
duly burden such constitutional interests as the right of access to
the courts or the right to a remedy for all wrongs. 2 0 These pleas
to date have failed, meaning that a rational basis test has been
employed.28 ' In assessing certificate of merit standards, courts
have had "no difficulty" in concluding there is a rational relation-
277. See DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1150 (Clark, J., dissenting).
278. See id. at 1144 (viewing the provision as merely accelerating the time by
which the expert opinion must be obtained, though conceding that a report is needed
"even in cases in which expert testimony might not be necessary"). A similar
constitutional ruling on judicial power is found in Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs.,
807 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Mo. 1991) (en banc). For an example of an expert performing a
judicial function, see Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association, 347 N.E.2d 736
(1976) (requiring panel of a lawyer, judge, and physician to determine any liability and
compensation before a medical malpractice claim could be tried to a jury
unconstitutionally vested judicial power in nonjudicial personnel).
279. See, e.g., DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1146; McAlister, 588 N.E.2d at 1154;
Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 511.
280. See, e.g., DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1146 (right of access to courts); McAlister,
588 N.E.2d at 1157 (right to a remedy); Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 511, 512 (access to
courts value).
281. See DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1146; McAlister, 588 N.E.2d at 1154; Mahoney,
807 S.W.2d at 511.
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ship to a legitimate governmental interest, with legislative goals
involving the reduction of "the number of frivolous actions that
might otherwise be filed."12 In deeming the standards rational,
reviewing courts typically pay little attention to the inadequacy
or inconsistency in the empirical bases, seemingly assuming the
rationally stated goals are achieved.83
State constitutional challenges to certificate of merit stan-
dards, unlike their federal counterparts, often involve fundamen-
tal rights expressly recognized in state bills of rights that extend
beyond equal protection. Unsuccessful challenges in Illinois have
involved such fundamental rights as "the right.., to apply for
redress of grievances";2" the right to "find a certain remedy in
the laws for all injuries and wrongs" received to a "person, pri-
vacy, property or reputation";2
5 and the "right of trial by jury."
2
To date, certificate of merit requirements elsewhere have with-
stood similar challenges.
28 7
B. Problems with Certain Expert Opinion Pleading Standards
Assuming new forms of expert opinion pleading will be de-
bated, if not widely accepted, there are at least four major issues
which deserve particular attention.8 8 They involve the claims
282. DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1147; see also Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 512-13 (finding
legislature could have reasonably decided certificate of merit mandate in health care
provider cases "would ameliorate the cost and availability of health care services").
283. Federal due process rights are also usually raised, as are state equal
protection and due process rights, with similar results. See McAlister, 588 N.E.2d at
1153-54; Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 511.
284. ILL. CoNsT. art. I, § 5; cf, e.g., DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1146 (finding that the
provision does not "burdenGl a litigant's right of access to the courts under" either the
federal or Illinois constitutions).
285. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 12; see, e.g., DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1146 (holding Illinois
certificate of merit law for healing art malpractice claims "does not unconstitutionally
infringe on litigants' right of access to the courts").
286. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13; see, e.g., Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 507-09; cf DeLuna,
588 N.E.2d at 1149 (Clark, J., dissenting) (finding Illinois certificate of merit law for
healing art malpractice claims that mandates an expert deem the claim "meritorious"
violates separation of powers as the expert performs a function "normally reserved for
the trier of fact").
287. See, e.g., Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 507-10 (addressing state constitutional jury
trial and access to court rights); Royle v. Florida Hosp.-E. Orlando, 679 So. 2d 1209
(Fla. Dist. App. 1996) (state constitutional right of access to courts).
288. There are other significant issues as well. One involves the circumstances
under which the expert opinion pleading laws of one jurisdiction may be deemed
substantive and thus applicable in the courts of other jurisdictions. Cf Rhett Traband,
An Erie Decision: Should State Statutes Prohibiting the Pleading of Punitive Damages
Claims Be Applied in Federal Diversity Actions?, 26 STETSON L. REv. 225 (1996)
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covered, the nature of any expert opinion required, the relation-
ship of certificates of merit to other pleading standards, and the
opportunity for prefiling discovery.
1. Coverage
Significant problems with some special certificate of merit
standards involve issues of coverage, which include ambiguity
over what civil actions are covered, overinclusiveness, and
underinclusiveness. Particular attention should be directed to
these issues by legislators considering new special certificate of
merit standards.
An analysis of contemporary special certificate of merit stan-
dards reveals that it is often unclear when a certificate is re-
quired. Use of broad statutory language implicating "all actions"
for healing art malpractice, "whether in tort, contract or other-
wise,"28 9 or "any action" alleging "professional malpractice,"290
prompt uncertainty. In one state, certificate of merit standards
demand that negligence claims against doctors be distinguished
from medical malpractice claims.29' In light of the provisions for
harsh sanctions when claimants fail to comply,292 ambiguities
pose serious problems.
Another problem with special certificate of merit standards is
their overinclusiveness. For example, in a product liability ac-
tion, is an expert opinion needed to certify that a certain car
should not explode upon slight impact and that such an explo-
sion was the proximate cause of a claimant's injury where the
car model has prompted thousands of similar claims and where
the defendant's position on the defects in its cars may even be
favorable to claimants? Another example of overinclusiveness
can be illustrated by applying the Illinois healing art malpractice
law29 to the well-known case of Hawkins v. McGee.294 In Illinois,
(opining the statutes are substantive, though finding the cases split).
289. 735 ILL. CouP. STAT. AN. 5/2-622(a) (West 1993) (amended 1996).
290. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1987) (amended 1996).
291. See Safier & Vogelman M.D.s v. Kalvin, 579 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. App. Term.
1991) (finding medical malpractice, but not negligence, claims fall within New York
law).
292. See, e.g., Miller v. Gupta, 672 N.E.2d 1229 (Ill. 1996) (holding failure to file
affidavit in medical malpractice case leads to dismissal even though failure was due to
defendant's inadvertent destruction of x-rays, yet cause of action for spoliation of
evidence might be pleaded).
293. See supra Part III.B.
294. 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
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an expert report is required in every action alleging "healing art
malpractice" whether in "tort, contract or otherwise."2 95 Seem-
ingly, an expert report would be required in Hawkins, where the
defendant doctor allegedly breached the warranty that the small
scar on the plaintiff's hand would be as good as new after cos-
metic surgery, and the surgery instead resulted in a hairy, claw-
like hand.2 96 Many such "malpractice" claims should not require
an expert to determine the defendant breached the contemplated
standard of care. In rejecting a challenge to the Illinois healing
art malpractice law, the DeLuna court did acknowledge that a
health professional's report would be required "even in cases in
which expert testimony might not be necessary at trial,"2 97 but
seemed unfazed as it said this merely reflected "the legislature's
assessment of the statute's desired scope."298 By contrast, some
states have acted more responsibly by expressly limiting their
certificate of merit requirements to claims for which "expert
testimony would be necessary to establish a prima facie case."299
Beside uncertainty and overinclusiveness, underinclusiveness
is occasionally a problem as well. For example, in North Dakota
"an admissible expert opinion to support the allegation of profes-
sional negligence" is usually needed shortly after a civil action is
commenced, but only if the defendant is a "physician, nurse or
hospital licensed by" North Dakota.81 The aim is not to better
regulate in-state licensed professionals, as the requirements
include no duty to report alleged negligence to state licensing
officials and appear in a statutory section on civil judicial proce-
dure. Are North Dakota claimants less likely to pursue meritless
claims against nonresidents than they are against residents?
2. The expert opinion
Significant problems with some special certificate of merit
requirements involve the circumstances under which the expert
opinion is secured and presented. For example, issues arise re-
295. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(a) (West 1993) (amended 1996).
296. See Hawkins, 146 A. at 643.
297. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1144 (Ill. 1992) (citing
Walski v. Tiesenga, 381 N.E.2d 279 (Ill. 1978), where the court held no expert
testimony was needed on standard of care if the physician's conduct was grossly
negligent or the treatment was so common that a lay person could readily appraise it).
298. Id.
299. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-601 (West 1989).
300. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (1991).
CERTIFICATES OF MERIT
garding the timing of any needed expert report or filing. The
proposition that expert opinion pleading requires little more
than an expedited presentation of evidentiary materials which
will inevitably be forthcoming0l seems questionable. This was
recognized in the Model Uniform Product Liability Act of 1979,02
which did not require early filings of expert opinions by claim-
ants but which did allow the court to conduct postfiling, pretrial
evaluations of experts selected by the parties. 3  The purpose of
such evaluations was to weed out biased and unqualified ex-
perts. °4 The proponents of the act evidently found it would not
be cost efficient to utilize the procedure in all cases, deeming it
most appropriate in cases where it was more likely there would
be attempts at presenting unqualified witnesses. The rationales
for a pretrial judicial evaluation of experts and for an expert
report to be attached to an initial complaint may be similar,0 5
but the latter carries additional significant costs. 306 Consider a
product liability lawsuit under the Illinois certificate of merit
law. The plaintiff must find a qualified expert to prepare the
usually lengthy affidavit. Yet a potential defendant, in a later
answer, may be willing or obligated to admit to the validity of
many, if not all, of the expert's opinions. The resulting waste of
time and money could be avoided under the approach of the 1979
Model Act, which allows disclosure of experts to be compelled
301. See DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1144 (deeming requirement of health care
professional's certification at time of initial pleading "merely" to accelerate "the time
by which an expert opinion must be obtained").
302. Notice, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,746 (1979).
303. See id.
304. See ic at 62,746-47.
305. The rationales both involve the elimination of frivolous claims and defenses
and a more expeditious claim resolution process.
306. By requiring a plaintiff to obtain an expert opinion before filing a complaint,
litigation costs will undoubtedly increase for plaintiffs and may prohibit some plaintiffs
from seeking redress. But cf Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 1997) (stating that
the section of the Prison Litigation Reform Act which requires prisoners proceeding in
forma pauperis to pay a partial filing fee before filing a lawsuit is a legitimate and
constitutional exercise of Congressional power to reduce frivolous lawsuits). The court's
reasoning in Roller may apply as well to the argument that the certificate of merit
provision denies court access rights to indigent plaintiffs, as the court stated:
Those living outside of prisons cannot file a lawsuit every time they suffer
a real or imagined slight. Instead, they must weigh the importance of redress
before resorting to the legal system. If a prisoner determines that his funds
are better spent on other items rather than filing a civil rights suit, "he has
demonstrated an implied evaluation of that suit."
Id at 233 (quoting Lumbert v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 827 F.2d 257, 260 (7th Cir.
1987)).
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usually only after the initial pleadings have been completed,
typically when the court actually finds that money or time could
be saved. Filing expert opinion disclosures later in the action
would also ameliorate some legitimate concerns over the breadth
of coverage, which could be resolved in an adversarial setting in
advance of the procurement of any expert, as well as lessen the
need for possibly successive expert opinions as claims are
amended to conform with information gleaned from pleadings
and discovery.
Another problem with the expert opinion occurs when the
testimony of the expert preparing the opinion must be admissi-
ble. 7 It is difficult for trial courts very early in civil litigation to
make such a determination. Regarding the trial court's
"gatekeeping" responsibility in deciding upon the admissibility of
expert scientific testimony, the U.S. Supreme Court has said:
"ITlhe trial court judge must determine at the outset .
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid ... [and] whether that reasoning or meth-
odology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."308 Such
determinations at the outset of civil litigation are problematic
because they may lead to excessive satellite litigation,3 9 as was
often the case under the 1983 version of Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 11.310 Additionally, the relevant factual issues may not have
surfaced at such a preliminary stage.
3. Relationship to other pleading laws
Courts considering challenges to special certificate of merit
requirements usually note that their purposes "parallel"3 1 ' or are
307. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-46 (1991) (requiring "an admissible expert
opinion to support the allegation of professional negligence").
308. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
309. See, e.g., Duran by Duran v. Cullinan, 677 N.E.2d 999, 1004 (Ill. Ct. App.
1997). In determining whether expert's methodology of extrapolation from scientific
materials is generally accepted within the scientific community, the trial court was
faced with two competing affidavits. On the use of technical advisors by trial court
judges undertaking gatekeeping responsibilities regarding expert testimony, see
generally Comment, Improving Judicial Catekeeping: Technical Advisors and Scientific
Evidence, 110 HARv. L. REV. 941 (1997).
310. In the note accompanying the 1993 amendment to the 1983 version of Rule
11, the Advisory Committee said the Rule has been altered to attempt to reduce the
large number of motions for sanctions presented under the old Rule, most of which
were denied. See the Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401,
523 (1993) (Advisory Commit~ee letter).
311. Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., 807 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Mo. 1991) (en
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the "same"3' as the purposes of the otherwise applicable general
pleading laws. Both attempt to promote good faith and reason-
able presentation of claims in order to eliminate or curtail frivo-
lous actions. I3 Occasionally, courts even suggest that the special
certificate of merit requirements would usually be dictated by
the general pleading laws even if special provisions had never
been enacted or were repealed.$ 4
Courts generally overstate the similarities and belittle, or
simply avoid, key differences between special certificate of merit
laws and general pleading laws. For example, in Illinois in the
DeLuna case, the state court focused on the similarities between
the "burdens" on pleaders of the special and general laws, 15
seemingly finding that the major differences in the "conse-
quences of noncompliance" were inconsequential, though dis-
missal was far more likely in the certificate of merit setting. 16 In
deeming the burdens "similar," the court belittled key differ-
ences between pleading evidence and nonevidence; between
pleading evidentiary and ultimate facts; and between generally
pleading the opinion work product of a claimant's lawyer on the
merits of a claim and specially pleading a nonattorney, testifying
expert's opinion assessing both ultimate and evidentiary facts.
Such differences are key in that certificate of merit requirements
are more likely to lock claimants into their early positions, thus
limiting later opportunities to amend pleadings or to alter pro-
jected offers of proof, as well as to lock them into their testifying
experts.
banc).
312. DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1145 (Ill. 1992).
313. Compare ad (stating the purpose of special certificate of merit requirements
is to prevent the "misuse of the judicial process in order to wrest a settlement from
the adversary by the threat of the exaggerated cost of defense" by controlling
"ungrounded claims"), with Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 507-08 (stating the purpose of the
general pleading requirement is "the elimination or curtailment of frivolous actions").
314. See DeLuna, 588 N.E.2d at 1145 (holding that "in many cases" a health
professional's prefiling review would be "a necessary concomitant" of satisfying the
general pleading laws).
315. Id
316. Compare 735 ILL. COMP'. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(g) (West 1993) (amended 1996)
(holding failure to file is grounds for dismissal), with ILL. Sup. CT. R. 137 (stating
"appropriate sanction" for violation, with no express mention of dismissal), and
Freeland v. Amigo, 103 F.3d 1271 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding trial court abused its
discretion by precluding testimony of medical malpractice claimant's expert on the
ground that claimant failed to comply with pretrial order setting date for discovery
cutoff where preclusion resulted in dismissal and where less drastic sanctions were not
considered).
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4. Prefiling information gathering
There are two concerns with the prefiling information gather-
ing provisions of current certificate of merit standards requiring
that an expert opinion be obtained prior to the commencement of
a civil action on a designated claim. The first concern involves
the failure to provide for sufficient opportunity to access infor-
mation otherwise unavailable to a claimant.317 This occurs where
certification is required at the time a civil action is commenced,
as there is little or no chance for formal discovery before filing
and there is no duty of mandatory disclosure if a claim is noticed
though not filed. The second concern involves affording a defend-
ing party access to information contained in the claimant's ex-
pert opinion.
Without an opportunity for formal discovery or without man-
datory prefiling information disclosure, a claimant may be inca-
pable of procuring a required certificate. Such a failure could
result in dismissal with 1 or without3 19 prejudice. This result
seems quite possible in product liability actions, where claimants
often do not have much access to data on the products in ques-
tion. At the least, avenues of court-supported prefiling informa-
tion gathering should be available on a case-by-case basis. In
these situations, a provision like that in the heightened pleading
standard for federal private securities litigation would be war-
ranted, as it would allow discovery which is necessary to "pre-
vent undue prejudice." 2 °
Where the defendant receives a wealth of information about
the plaintiff's claim via an expert opinion before the plaintiff has
had much or any opportunity for formal discovery from the de-
317. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (1987) (amended 1996) (making no mention
of accessing information prior to submission of expert affidavit in professional
malpractice claim); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-623(a)(2) (West 1996) (stating product
liability claimant only has accss to materials allowing claimant to conduct testing); id.
at 5/2-622(a)(3) (West 1993) (amended 1996) (providing that healing art malpractice
claimant only guaranteed access to medical records).
318. See 735 ILL. COMfP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-622(g) (West 1993) (amended 1996) (stating
dismissal is the sanction for noncompliance with healing art malpractice certificate
law); ILL. SUP.CT. R. 273 (stating involuntary dismissal usually operates as an
adjudication on the merits unless based on lack of jurisdiction, venue, or indispensable
party). But see DeLuna v. Treister, 676 N.E. 2d 973 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (allowing new
lawsuit with necessary certificate even though the previous suit, DeLuna v. St
Elizabeth's Hospital, 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1147 (1992), was dismissed on grounds that
certificate of merit was lacking).
319. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225(5) (West 1988).
320. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(B) (1995).
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fendant or others, the plaintiff is forced to do a significant
amount of trial preparation that may later need to be reevalu-
ated. Most certificate of merit provisions do not specifically ad-
dress whether amendments altering initial factual or legal theo-
ries should be liberally allowed. This creates a problem for the
plaintiff who decides to use a different expert at trial than dur-
ing prefiling inquiry or whose strategies may change when new
information is received from the defendant or others. Addition-
ally, compulsory disclosure of the entirety of an expert opinion
and all information leading to its creation often will air other-
wise undiscoverable work product, especially where the expert
will not testify, and thus requires a claimant's attorney to pro-
ceed so cautiously in obtaining the expert opinion that zealous
representation becomes quite difficult. Special certificate of
merit provisions typically fail to address significant attorney-
client communications, doctor-patient communications, work
product, and waiver issues.
VI. CONCLUSION
Civil litigation reform to reduce frivolous civil lawsuits was a
hot topic in the most recent Presidential debates. It has stirred
much recent interest and action in state and federal legislatures.
Some new developments involve special pleading norms. Law-
makers will likely debate and implement new special pleading
requirements in coming years, often involving certificates of
merit. Such certificates are now required for most or some pro-
fessional malpractice claims in several states. Illinois recently
adopted a certificate of merit standard for product liability ac-
tions, while certificates of merit for certain childhood sexual
abuse claims are necessary in both California and Louisiana. As
debate continues over the need for and benefits of such special
pleading requirements, lawmakers should ensure that empirical
evidence supports any new legislation."1 In implementing new
certificates of merit, careful attention must be directed to consti-
tutional issues, as well as to policy questions involving the
breadth of coverage, the nature of any needed expert opinion,
321. The Illinois Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995 were signed only fifteen
days after being introduced. See Russ Bleemer, How Illinois Overhauled Tort Law in
Two Weeks, N.J. L.J., April 10, 1995, at 4.
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the opportunity for prefiling discovery, and the possible sanc-
tions upon noncompliance.
Upon reviewing various approaches to the use of special cer-
tificates of merit to reduce frivolous lawsuits, certain provisions
for any future legislation are recommended to address the prob-
lems raised by current statutes. To address ambiguities in the
bredth of coverage, certificate of merit requirements should be
limited to claims where expert testimony is necessary to estab-
lish a prima facie case. Expert opinions should be required only
after the initial pleadings have been completed, after there has
been some opportunity for discovery, and only when the court
deems them necessary. Expert opinions filed only for the purpose
of certifying the merits of the civil action should not normally be
admissible unless the experts are expected to testify at trial.
Most would agree with President Clinton who said in the
1996 Presidential debates that frivolous civil lawsuits should be
reduced as long as deserving claimants are also not denied recov-
ery. Easier said than done.
